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Preface 
A pandemic influenza is unpredictable, both in terms of when the next pandemic may erupt, 
how fast it will spread, and lastly, how severe it will be. This presents considerable challenges 
for communicating risk to the public since past experiences with a pandemic cannot easily be 
attributed to the next; a fact not underlined by the fact that uncertainty in expert risk estimates 
and public perceptions of the pandemic risk may put further strains upon communication of 
risk during a pandemic. In this regard I found it interesting and motivating to use my 
academic background in Risk Psychology, Environment and Safety (RIPENSA) to research 
this problem area of communicating risk to the public. Proposing scientific methods which 
may address these problems to strengthen risk communication for a future pandemic in 
Norway has been an illuminating and rewarding process for me personally. The experiences 
and knowledge I bring with me from writing this thesis will undoubtedly prove useful in 
future work.  
 My sincere thanks go first and foremost to my supervisor Britt-Marie Drottz-Sjöberg 
for her invaluable support in completing this thesis. Her good advice and constructive 
feedback have helped and challenged me to lift the thesis to the level I myself could best 
achieve.   
 I would also like to thank my fellow students for their social and motivational support 
which have made the writing of this thesis a positive experience. Last, but not least, I would 
like to thank my parents, Lars and Evy Horpestad Tjåland, and my brother Sturla Horpestad 
Tjåland, for their support during the frustrations and pleasures in the process of completing 
this thesis. 
 
Trondheim, March 2012 
Kyrre Horpestad Tjåland 
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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the topic of risk communication effectiveness on a national level in 
Norway regarding a future pandemic. The consequences of a pandemic influenza will depend 
partly upon the risk communication strategy effectiveness. Within risk psychology research, 
such a strategy should fully consider how general and situational factors may influence public 
perceptions of the pandemic risk, and how public perceptions affect risk communication 
efficiency and, consequently, the behavior of recipients towards the pandemic. If ignored, 
communication gaps could result in overall greater consequences for the general public and/or 
unequal protection for vulnerable risk groups during a future pandemic.   
The overall aim of the thesis is therefore to help enhance risk communication 
efficiency, and thereby risk management. To address this area of research the thesis 
summarizes scientific research on risk perception and risk communication, and reviews 
experiences from prior situations and cases. The central interest of the thesis has been how 
public perceptions of a pandemic risk relate to risk communication efficiency and 
communication strategy. Scientific communication models used to address public perceptions, 
which may limit or hinder correct health behavior, are presented and their use in potential 
future pandemic settings are discussed. The thesis argues that risk communication efficiency 
will be strengthened by use of scientific models of communication. In this context especially 
models on information processing (i.e. ELM), approaches eliciting mental contents (i.e. 
mental models), and practical work with communication of risk (i.e. RISCOM).  
Predictions of future pandemics are extremely hard to make. To cover various 
possibilities within a future pandemic this thesis discusses risk communication challenges in 
situations with different combinations of possibility and consequences (severity of the virus). 
The idea is that different situations demand different amount of, and different approaches to, 
the management of risk. Lastly, an effective risk communication strategy does not stop when 
the pandemic risk officially subsides. It is recommended that communicators learn from the 
“rights and wrongs” encountered in the latest pandemic and thus ensure public trust in risk 
communication for the next health risk. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The theme for this thesis is the psychological and social challenges related to the construction 
of effective risk communication processes for the next possible pandemic flu in Norway. It is 
based upon a theoretical study of risk perception and risk communication research, and work 
and experiences related to the A (H1N1) pandemic. 
 
1.1 Risk communication 
Risk communication has developed as a serious area of research during the last decades and is 
recognized as an important and integral part in the political process of managing risks. Its 
development is closely related to the area of risk perception research. As used here risk 
communication is defined as “communication intended to supply laypeople with the 
information they need to make informed, independent judgments about risks to health, safety 
and the environment” (Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 2002, p. 4). It is important to 
differentiate between the acts of risk communication and crisis communication. Crisis 
communication takes place in situations which are labeled as a “crisis”. It is here defined as a 
sudden, high threat event, requiring immediate action, and with short time for decision 
making. Communication during such an event would require quick response to the situational 
development and likely a more authoritarian approach to ensure public life or health due to 
the nature of the situation. On the other hand, a “risk” situation is rarely sudden and will 
rarely be attached to short time decision making, but it may by a high threat event under 
development. Communication during such a period will involve more time to prepare and the 
communication will be less authoritarian and more open to feedback in ensuring public 
health. The situations overlap to some degree (e.g. some risk situations may require quick 
responses to isolated developments) but are usually different in their requirements for quick 
response and time for clarification of the overall situation. 
Public perceptions of risk were early on perceived to be “irrational” and were often 
readily dismissed in the policy process by risk assessors and managers (Frewer, 2004). 
Traditional risk communication was thus based upon risk estimates, provided by experts, and 
mainly focused upon technical representations of risk (Fischhoff, 1989). Approaches focusing 
upon other contexts than technical estimates were often lacking when it came to influencing 
public behaviors (Frewer, 2004). As such the early attempts of risk communication were 
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virtually always one-way approaches of communication based upon simple assumptions of 
the public’s needs (Breakwell, 2007).  
Since then, however, risk communication strategies have made a turn in the approach 
to the public. Especially so in democratic societies where the public has a say in the decision 
making process of risk management. Communication efforts are now focusing upon public 
participation and active dissemination of information. A deeper understanding and 
legitimization of public perception of risk have lead to a two-way process of risk 
communication (Fischhoff, 1989). Experience from accidents, such as the Seveso chemical 
accident in 1976, has led to the development of public legal rights to information from 
authorities and institutions about hazards. Notably the Seveso Directive in 1982, reviewed in 
1996 (European Commission, 2012a), and the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE, 1998) Convention on access to information, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. Also known as the Aarhus 
Convention.  
 However, risk communication is an area where one begrudgingly has to realize that 
there is no “one-size-fits-all” strategy viable for any domain of risk communication (Nurse, 
Creese, Goldsmith, & Lamberts, 2011). Though risk communication history consists of 
approaches that have tried to do so (see Fischhoff, 1989; 1995). Risk communication 
strategies have to be tailored to address the current specific risk and the different purposes and 
target groups that exist in the current situation (Nurse et al., 2011). The effectiveness of a risk 
communication strategy can therefore not truly be evaluated before after the situation has 
passed. However, effectiveness cannot be ensured if the risk manager is not prepared and 
have no conceptualized strategy for managing communication and mitigation for the next 
possible risk. Predicating future public perceptions of risk and risk communication options 
aimed at handling spread of vital information and possible controversy are important goals of 
risk research and the central themes of this thesis.  
 
1.2 Challenges to risk communication 
The development of an effective risk communication strategy is riddled with challenges. The 
first being that risk communication during a pandemic inevitably falls under the area of risk 
management on, in this thesis, a national level. The risk management framework on such a 
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level has as its goal to make “scientifically sound, cost effective, integrated actions that 
reduce or prevent risks while taking into account social, cultural, ethical, political, and legal 
considerations” (Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management, 1997, p. 2). Risk communication in such a context can be described as “the 
interactive exchange of information and opinions throughout the risk analysis process 
concerning risk” (FAO/WHO, 2001). The risk analysis process (also called risk governance) 
consists of the three elements: Risk assessment, risk management and risk communication 
(Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, 1997). 
Risk communication efforts on this level will have to involve arenas in which those 
who may be affected by the hazard (stakeholders) may participate with the risk managers and 
experts in the decision making process. Public, or specific stakeholders’ perception of the risk 
and decision concerns will likely not be the same as that of the risk manager and the experts 
and such differences have to be addressed in an arena where all opinions are considered 
legitimate (Fischhoff, 1989). Further, risk messages will eventually have to be communicated 
to the general public. Such information needs to take into account what the risk itself is (risk 
assessment), how the people may react to the information and what knowledge they may 
already possess of the risk, both true and wrong (risk perception), and be based upon a 
systematic analysis of what the public needs to know (Fischhoff, 1989). In addition, a concern 
in risk communication is how information should be presented. Done right the risk 
communication may make the public more aware of the risk and actually change their opinion 
and behavior towards it in a way that promotes health, done wrong and the public might be 
left frustrated and angry towards the risk manager. 
This thesis is based on the author’s own interest in organizations which have public 
safety as their working platform. Since risk communication, and especially getting it right, 
seems to be a growing trend within these organizations the author wished to explore this 
platform closer with a focus on the psychological aspects of risk communication. The greater 
part of the literature in this thesis is illuminating the psychological aspects related to risk 
perception and risk communication processes, with a lesser focus upon other aspects of the 
greater framework of risk management (e.g. political and financial concerns). While 
psychological research often ignores the larger framework aspects, they are recognized as 
governing factors steering risk management, and consequently risk communication.  
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Effective risk communication is a composite concept wherein the rating of 
effectiveness will vary in relation to what is aimed to be achieved by communicating the risk. 
The rating of effectiveness in this context will therefore be based upon theoretical 
assumptions of change in public attitude, and subsequent behavior, towards the risk as a result 
of increased awareness of the hazard and its risks. An effective risk communication strategy is 
thus defined as a communication strategy that successfully informs the public so that it 
increases public awareness of the risk and, which in turn, facilitates attitude and behavioral 
change towards the risk that is beneficial for the public’s health.  
 
1.3 The purpose of this thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to a) expand the knowledge in the area of risk 
communication from a psychological perspective, and also to b) review the A (H1N1) 
pandemic development to highlight potential challenges related to ensuring effective risk 
communication strategies. Of special relevance here is communication of health related risks 
and specifically the risk of a future pandemic. On this basis c) the discussion and conclusion 
will focus on the question: What is an effective risk communication strategy for informing the 
public about a future pandemic health risk?  
 
1.4 The thesis`s disposition 
The following chapters are divided into theory, case description, discussion and conclusion. 
 The theory chapter is based upon Fischhoff’s (1989) detailing of the risk 
communication process, and it will be described in the opening of the chapter. The chapter 
will start with a theoretical explanation of risk perception research and present three factors of 
risk perception especially relevant for the pandemic risk and health risks in general. It will 
then look at the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) to describe how people process 
information. The mental model approach to risk communication will then be presented. Some 
legal aspects to risk communication, and the RISCOM model of transparency will then be 
presented. The chapter will end with lessons learned from risk communication history as to 
good ways to convey a message. 
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 The Case chapter consists of a description of the A (H1N1) pandemic as it developed 
in Norway. The main focus in this chapter is the development of the pandemic over time in 
Norway, related to how information became available to the health authorities, and how this 
information was communicated to the public. It will be further substantiated with quantitative 
data from Eurobarometer (2009) and Synovate (2009) on the public’s perception of the risk 
and their attitude and behavior towards it.  
 The case description is used as a basis for the following discussion on how to ensure 
effective risk communication for the next possible pandemic in Norway. This will be done by 
links to the theoretical chapter and the quantitative data, the parts which form the basis for the 
discussion on how to ensure effective risk communication relative to the next possible 
pandemic in Norway. Lastly a conclusion based upon the contents of this thesis will be 
presented at the end of the report. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
2.0 Theory 
The theory chapter will provide a theoretical background for constructing a risk 
communication strategy related to the aim presented above. It is based upon the general 
outline of the risk communication process defined by Fischhoff (1989).  
According to Fischhoff (1989) there are two necessary starting points in risk 
communication work which can be summarized by the following questions: How will the 
public react to the risk? What do the people already know? The first question entails an 
analysis of public perceptions of the risk and possible reactions that may come from such 
perceptions. The second question entails an analysis of public and expert knowledge about the 
risk (Fischhoff, 1989). To address the first question the first chapter will outline risk 
perception and how the public might react to risks based on their perceptions. To answer the 
second question the second chapter will outline how people process information through the 
ELM theory and then look at how public knowledge about risks might be mapped through the 
use of mental models. 
The third question, according to Fischhoff (1989), is what do the people need to 
know? This is not an easy question to answer. There may be a big difference between what 
people need to know about a risk (factual knowledge) and what they themselves feel they 
want to know. Added to this are public legal rights to information and participation. Factual 
knowledge can be addressed by utilizing questionnaire studies or, for example, the mental 
model approach detailed later in the chapter. What the public wants to know can only be 
investigated through a close dialogue with the public. We will therefore address this issue, 
firstly, with an explanation of the public rights to information and participation given by the 
UNECE (1998) and, secondly, presenting the use of the RISCOM model of transparency 
which provides an arena of discourse for finding out and answering the questions of what the 
public wants to know. 
A subsequent and last question is: How do we say it? The focus here is on message 
content. This will be discussed by lessons learned from risk communication history.  
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2.1 How do people react to risk? The role of risk perception 
Risk perception, as developed in psychological literature, is referring to “various types of 
attitudes about risks and hazards and judgments about them” (Breakwell, 2007, p. 14). Risk 
perception is seen as a subjective evaluation of risk, that is, a subjective evaluation of a 
possible future negative event related to a hazard. It should not be confused with expert risk 
assessment calculations which often result in mathematical estimations usually presented 
numerically, probably more often than not presented in terms of likelihood and severity
1
. 
Likelihood here relates to the chance of being exposed to a hazard (e.g. perceived likelihood 
of being infected by a virus). Severity relates to the consequences of being exposed to the 
hazard (e.g. perceived consequences from subsequent infection).  
The core assumption related to risk perception in this thesis is that risk perception is an 
important determinant of protective health behavior
2
. This means that if an individual 
perceives a risk as being dangerous for his/her well being then he/she will have an increased 
likelihood of changing his/her behavior to minimize or eliminate the risk. Such an assumption 
is debated in risk perception research and warrants justification, the thesis will present some 
research that deny as well as support the assumption. However, the thesis cannot go into a full 
review of the subject matter due to constraints in time and writing space. 
A review on risk perception research by van der Pligt (1996) found that, generally, 
research results on the impact of perceived risk on health behavior is mixed. He found that 
risk perception research only shows it to be a modest predictor of health behavior when 
compared to other behavioral determinants such as past behavior or subjective norms. 
Although generally, the perception of personal vulnerability to health risks seems to be a 
necessary component for individuals to consider behavioral change, van der Pligt (1996) did 
not find this to be sufficient to induce behavioral change. He concludes by stating that there is 
not enough evidence to confirm or deny that perceived risk is related to the adoption of health 
behavior. It is important to note that the study by van der Pligt (1996) focused upon the 
likelihood component of risk perception not the severity aspect. 
                                                 
1
 Other words in risk research for likelihood are probability, and for severity other words are effect and 
consequence. The thesis uses the words interchangeably. However, the meaning is the same. 
2
 Other words for health behavior may be protective or preventive behavior as used by van der Pligt (1996). By 
health behavior the thesis means behavior intended to promote health. This can be done by changing ones 
behavior to protect or prevent oneself from the risk thus ensuring ones health. 
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The approach of this thesis agrees with van der Pligt’s (1996) conclusion that there are 
other determinants of health behavior than perceived risk. However, it is argued here that risk 
perception is an important determinant of health behavior and an analysis that supports such a 
notion is presented. A meta-analysis of eligible studies (e.g. removing studies with ambiguous 
or impersonal questions) looking at the relationship between risk perception and health 
behavior for one health protective action, vaccination, was performed by Brewer, Chapman, 
Gibbons, Gerrard, McCaul, and Weinstein (2007). The meta-analysis consisted of 34 studies, 
28 being cross-sectional and 6 being prospective studies. All the data in the original studies 
were correlational since no previous experimental studies on the subject matter had examined 
how perceived risk affects vaccination.  
The study assessed three measures of risk perception related to vaccination: perceived 
illness likelihood, susceptibility and severity. Susceptibility is an overlapping concept with 
likelihood and both are often used interchangeably. By likelihood Brewer and colleagues 
(2007) meant the probability of getting harmed by a hazard under certain behavior conditions 
(e.g. the chance of getting the flu if I do not get a vaccine is...), while susceptibility 
emphasized individual resistance or constitutional vulnerability (e.g. I am more likely to get 
the flu than other people). Lastly, severity was defined as the extent of harm a hazard would 
cause (e.g. how serious a disease is the flu?). The results showed strong evidence that 
perceived likelihood; susceptibility and severity are reliably related to vaccination behavior, 
although the relationships were small to moderate. However, Brewer and colleagues (2007) 
state that the size of the relationship can more likely be characterized as moderate because of 
methodological weaknesses that suppress the size of the relationship. Many of the effects 
stemmed from cross-sectional studies, but larger effects were found in longitudinal studies.  
The study by Brewer and colleagues (2007) enhances confidence in the assumption of 
risk perception being a determinant of behavior, though there is no possibility to make claims 
of causality. There are other determinants of behavior. For example, Brewer and colleagues 
2007) found that studies of medical personnel yielded a smaller effect size than studies of sick 
and/or high-risk adults. Hence risk perception is less of a motivator for health personnel in 
relation to vaccination behavior. This may be due to advanced knowledge and other 
motivational factors such as the concerns that are specific to the job role, such as not wanting 
to spread infection to the patients, or that they are required to get vaccinated. In summary, 
more experimental research on risk perception is needed to provide a more definite 
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confirmation of a causal relationship between risk perception and health behavior (Brewer et 
al., 2007).  
 
2.2 Differences in risk perception between experts and the public  
Before going into general theory of risk perception it is important to note the observed 
differences in risk perception between two main groups in the risk management setting, 
namely the experts and the public. The concept of expert refers to an individual who has 
advanced topical knowledge in a given field above that of the average person in a population 
(Sjöberg, 2003). It should be noted that the groups are not homogenous and in reality there 
will be differences within the groups.  
It has been observed and recognized that the experts and the public rarely have an 
equal perception of the risk (Sjöberg, 1999a; Fischhoff, 1989). A study by Sjöberg and 
Drottz-Sjöberg (1994, as cited in Sjöberg, 1999a) where they asked their respondents (experts 
and the public) to judge the risk from domestic nuclear power found a large difference in 
perceived risk between the two groups. Very few experts judged the risk to be larger than 
“very small”, while 65% of the public did so. When the respondents were asked to judge if a 
solution to the problem of how to store the nuclear waste was satisfactory solved the same 
pattern was shown. Very few of the public felt the problem was satisfactory solved while the 
majority of the experts felt it was. Differences in risk perception between the experts and the 
public have also been found in other areas such as environmental risks (see US Environmental 
Protection Agency, 1987) and risks related to transportation (see Rundmo & Moen, 2006).  
The differences between the experts and the public cannot be attributed to different 
levels of knowledge only. In fact the public has been shown to be quite knowledgeable, and 
knowledge itself has been shown to explain little of the variance in risk perception (Sjöberg, 
1999a). Since the public have a relatively good understanding of risks the idea of the public as 
reacting in a highly emotional and irrational manner due to ignorance is unfounded. The 
difference in risk perception between the groups can quite likely be ascribed to several factors 
such as perceived control, familiarity, gender, trust (experts trust industry, agencies and other 
experts more than the public), education etc. (Sjöberg, 1999a). One factor of note is the 
difference in definitions of risk between the groups. Experts tend to rate risk by probability 
while the public tend to rate risk by consequence (Sjöberg, 1999b; Drottz-Sjöberg, 1992).  
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However, it is not within the scope of this paper to fully address the difference in risk 
perception between the experts and the public. The point here is that a difference in risk 
perception between the groups exists and it presents a challenge for the risk manager since 
he/she has to consider all involved in the decision making process. Though it falls to the risk 
manager and the experts to make decisions on how to reduce a risk the public is also to be 
included into the decision making process by law (e.g. UNECE, 1998). A common approach 
is also as a necessity if one should warrant effective risk communication (this will be 
addressed more closely in the risk communication chapter). Failure to take note of the 
difference between the groups in a risk communication setting, for example only listening to 
the expert’s judgement of the risk, will likely fail to address the public’s perceptions of the 
risk making the communication efforts less effective.  
 
2.3 Measuring risk perception – the psychometric paradigm 
The psychometric paradigm is a methodological approach to exploring risk perception. It uses 
different varieties of psychological scaling methods to produce quantitative measures of 
perceived risk and benefit (Breakwell, 2007). It is not a theory that explains risk perception 
but it has given rise to models that have tried to do so. Research within the psychometric 
paradigm, such as the psychometric model by Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, and 
Combs (1978), showed that it was possible to quantify average ratings of perceived risk in the 
public. But more importantly it also proved that it is possible to ask people for complex risk 
judgments about difficult societal problems and receive orderly, interpretative responses 
making it possible to predict public risk perception.  
 
2.3.1 The psychometric model  
Some of the earliest and most influential model of risk perception (the psychometric 
model) was developed by Fischhoff et al. (1978). The model is a response to the discussion of 
“acceptable risk” and factors in risk perception initiated by Chauncey Starr (1969) and it 
represents an alternative approach to that of Chauncey Starr (1969). Risk perception in this 
model is seen as a function of judgments of properties of the hazard. In the 1978 study they 
asked subjects to rate 30 hazards on nine seven-point scales indicating qualitative 
characteristics of the risks: whether they were voluntary, had immediate effect, were known 
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by the person exposed to the risk, known to science, controllable, new, chronic or 
catastrophic, common or dreaded, and how likely they were to be fatal. Through factor 
analysis of the nine dimensions, two main factors of risk perception: “dread” and 
“knowledge”. Later research by Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1980, cited in Slovic et 
al., 1982) confirmed the two factors and included a third factor “number of affected”. The 
“dread” factor of the risk encompassed characteristics such as certain to be fatal, potentially 
catastrophic, and dreaded. The “knowledge” factor of the risk – encompassed characteristics 
such as uncontrollable, new, involuntary, poorly known and having delayed consequences. 
The higher the rating of dread and knowledge, the higher the risk perception was perceived to 
be. 
The explained variance of risk perception based on the model has long been thought to 
be around 80%. However, a study by Sjöberg (2000a) found that it can only explain around 
20% of the variance of raw data. By incorporating a new factor including the aspect 
interference with nature the explanatory power of the model increased to 30-40%, thus nearly 
doubling the explained variance. The new factor takes into account perception of unnatural, 
immoral characteristics associated with a hazard. Another study by Sjöberg (2000b) labels the 
factor “tampering with nature”. Sjöberg’s (2000a) conclusion is that the old model only 
account for a modest share of the variance of perceived risk. Taking into account aspects of 
tampering with nature and moral issues sheds more light onto risk perception of hazards and 
is worthy of serious consideration in future risk perception work. 
The psychometric model cannot explain all aspects of perceived risk. It is nonetheless 
a useful tool in mapping the average perceived risk related to the characteristics of the hazard 
in question. Getting an average rating of the hazard is a useful basis for risk communication 
since one can get a “feel” for how the average citizen perceives the overall risk. However, 
other factors are needed to get a more detailed view of perceived risk across different 
situations during the pandemic. In the A (H1N1) pandemic context the thesis deems following 
factors to be especially important predictors of perceived risk: Experience, trust, including 
antagonism, and media coverage. 
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2.3.2 Experience 
Personal experience with risks will invariably affect the perceived risk. It is therefore 
important for the risk manager to know the effects on how it shapes risk perception when 
communicating risk. We will describe here how individual risk perceptions generally develop 
as they become more knowledgeable about the risk from personal experience. This thesis 
recognizes that knowledge is multidimensional and does not assume that knowledge is 
something easily reduced to something an individual have or do not have. This would mean 
that either the public do not know what the experts talk about, and social conflicts stems 
primarily from public ignorance, or the public know what the experts talk about and will 
agree as a result (Johnson, 1993). Even experts perceive risks differently and frequently 
disagree between themselves even though they are more knowledgeable about risks than the 
public (Sjöberg, 1999a). Thus, there are several types of experience and knowledge, and 
individuals have more or less of it. 
A review of different hazards by Weinstein (1989) found that personal experience with 
risks generally leads to hazards being seen as more frequent and individuals more often view 
themselves as potential future victims. This was also found by Siegrist and Gutscher (2006) 
on the subject of perceived risk of flooding in Switzerland. They found in their results that 
experience was the strongest predictor to perceived risk. In other words those who had 
experienced flooding perceived greater flood-associated risks than those who had not 
experienced it. They concluded that this result suggests that risk perception is most strongly 
influenced by lay peoples own experience with flooding and they attributed this conclusion to 
the availability heuristic. According to the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973), people use the ease of which a hazard can be brought to mind as a cue to evaluate the 
probability of the hazard. Consequently, the ease with which the memory can be retrieved will 
affect the effect of the heuristic. As a result the more frequent an individual is exposed to a 
risk, and/or the more (negatively) sensational the experience was, the more risky it should be 
perceived.  
The heuristic is applicable to the findings by Siegrist and Gutscher (2006) and 
Weinstein (1989) since experience with a risk increased risk perception. However, the 
heuristic might be applicable to other factors as well, such as increased news coverage, 
images of climate change etc. influencing availability. What can be concluded is that personal 
experience of a negative event generally increases risk perception.  
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However, the effect of experience seems to dissipate over time. Weinstein (1989) 
found that the effect of experience on precautionary action was more prominent in occasions 
requiring a single action, such as buying insurance. Precautions requiring frequent actions, as 
in using seatbelts, were more short-lived. This type of decrease in perceived risk is often 
attributed to habituation towards the risk. Habituation towards the risk has been further 
illuminated in a study by Lima (2004). Lima (2004) performed a five year longitudinal study 
which consisted of 2797 interviews with 906 residents living at different distances from a 
waste incinerator. Four waves of surveys took place before and four after the incinerator 
started working. Her results showed that (i) before the incinerator became operational those 
living close to the hazard had a higher perceived risk than those living farther away and (ii) 
after the incinerator became operational those living close to the incinerator had a greater 
reduction in perceived risk than  those living farther away.  
It can thus be hypothesized that the effect of personal experience on risk perception 
firstly depends upon if the individual has been subjected to an adverse event (Weinstein, 
1989). Secondly, prolonged exposure to the hazard, without any adverse experience with it, 
will likely instill a habituation effect in individuals and more so in those who are more 
frequently exposed to the risk (Lima, 2004). Lastly, with no prior exposure (regarding 
frequency and/or extent of impact) to a risk will result in an initial higher risk perception than 
for those previously exposed who have not experienced adverse effect; the longer the 
uneventful exposure is, the lower the perceived risk is likely to be. 
 
 
2.3.3 Trust  
Trust is seen as probably one of the most influential factors for successful 
communication. There are different components to trust and different models try to explain 
the impact of trust upon perceived risk. This paper includes three trust factors that have been 
identified as some of the most influential in predicting perceived risk: social trust (trust in a 
source), epistemic trust (trust in scientific knowledge) and antagonism.  
Social trust: Social trust is defined as “the willingness to rely on those who have the 
responsibility for making decisions and taking actions related to the management of 
technology, the environment, medicine, or other realms of public health and safety” (Siegrist  
& Cvetkovich, 2000, p. 354). In short social trust (or lack thereof) affects the public’s 
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willingness to rely on the information source to take actions to protect them from the hazards, 
but also to rely, and possibly act, on the information from the information source. Trust in the 
information source about a hazardous technology or activity is important when the individual 
lacks personal knowledge (or experience) with the hazard (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). If 
the individuals has no prior knowledge on which to estimate risks they do not have any 
independent means by which to establish facts or truths about the risk. Judgment and reactions 
towards the risk will therefore have to rely on mediated information, showing the importance 
of mediators and trust in the information source (Drottz-Sjöberg, 2003). Information source in 
this thesis is the experts and institutions responsible for mitigating the risk. Experts, because 
of their expertise relative a particular hazard, are viewed as better able to assess the risk and 
benefits of associated with a hazard. However, the public often does not have the knowledge 
to assess the reliability of the information given by the experts. Hence it is hypothesized that 
decisions and judgments of the risk are guided by social trust (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000).  
This hypothesis is supported in research by Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2000). They 
found that if the public had no prior knowledge of the risk then strong correlations between 
social trust and judged risks and benefits emerged. If individuals were knowledgeable of the 
hazard no significant correlations between social trust and perceived risk and benefit were 
found. This suggests that when people lack knowledge they rely on social trust to make 
judgments about risk and benefit. Meaning they rely on the judgments of risk and benefit of 
the information source since they cannot make the judgments themselves. However, this does 
not mean that the public take all information for granted. Negative previous experience with 
the information source will likely make people more disinclined to listen than if they have no 
prior experience with the source (Drottz-Sjöberg, 2003).  
This is an important point to make in the functioning of social trust. Today’s society 
consists of a high diversity of expert knowledge which makes it difficult for the lay person to 
evaluate the truth of the information they receive. Consequently they have to more than ever 
rely on the reliability and honesty to those who give them information about the dangers that 
surround them. According to Frewer (2003) risk information from a trusted information 
source is internalized by the recipient and contributes to the way that an individual perceives 
and responds to the particular risk. On the other hand, if the recipient distrusts the information 
source then subsequent communications may be disregarded due to the information being 
perceived by the recipient as unreliable or self serving. It may even result in influencing 
attitudes in the opposite direction of that intended by the information source itself (Frewer, 
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2003). Ensuring social trust is therefore important for the information source since it 
determines if the public take heed to the messages. Should there be social distrust the public 
may look elsewhere for other more trusted sources of information (e.g. other experts) which 
may instill unfavorable perceptions of the particular risk (e.g. perceiving a highly dangerous 
risk as indifferent or overrate a negligible risk).  
Perceived antagonism: Perceived antagonism is the belief that the agent responsible 
for risk management (called risk manager from here on) is indifferent or even hostile, to the 
well-being of the public (Sjöberg, 2008). Results from research by Sjöberg (2008) on 
perceived antagonism and epistemic trust (detailed below) found that (i) perceived 
antagonism was an important (negative) determinant of trust, (ii) perceived antagonism was 
positively related to perceived risk, and (iii) perceived antagonism was a more important 
determinant of perceived risk than social trust. Social trust also accounted for a part of the 
variance in perceived risk, albeit social trust contributed less to the explained variance of 
perceived risk than perceived antagonism. 
Epistemic trust: Epistemic trust, meaning trust in the science on which the risk is 
based, plays an important role in risk perception (Sjöberg, 2008). Sjöberg (2001) found that 
46,5% of the public, as opposed to only 5,4% of the experts, were open to the possibility that 
there might be some effects from a nuclear repository that are unknown. The same trend was 
also observed in measurements on public and expert perceived risk from domestic and eastern 
nuclear power. These results show that the public is more skeptical about the completeness of 
expert knowledge than the experts themselves (Sjöberg, 2001). Lack of trust thus becomes 
prevalent when people believe that there are clear limits to how much science and experts can 
know. Any remaining unknown effects associated with the hazards were usually believed to 
be negative by both the public and the experts. In Sjöberg’s (2001) analysis the most 
important predictor of perceived risk from the three technologies under study turned out to be 
the beliefs about the likelihood that there might be effects that are still unknown. In a later 
study Sjöberg (2008) also found that epistemic trust played a larger role than social trust in 
accounting for risk perception and the acceptance of hazardous technologies and facilities. In 
a model Sjöberg (2008) shows that social trust had a small effect but was mediated by 
epistemic trust. Epistemic trust was only partially explained by social trust. The results from 
the same study also showed again that antagonism played the most important part in 
accounting for a sizable share of social trust rather than for epistemic trust which were 
considerably lower.  
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Summary of trust: The short accounting of the influence of the factor trust on risk 
perception shows that there are different categories of trust and that the categories will have 
different effects contingent upon the situational context of the risk. It can be hypothesized that 
risk perception from risks which are more technological in nature will mainly be dominated 
by epistemic trust whereas other non-technological risks will be mainly determined by social 
trust. The role of the risk manager in these cases should not be underestimated since results 
show that perceived indifferent or hostile manager will likely affect social trust negatively 
making the perceived risk increase. Lastly, social and epistemic distrust will likely have 
powerful negative consequences on any subsequent attempts at risk communication such as 
making the public unwilling to listen to risk managers’ messages. The impact of social trust, 
perceived antagonism and epistemic trust on risk communication will be further discussed in 
the discussion chapter of the thesis. 
 
2.3.4 Media  
With respect to many everyday hazards people acquire information about the risks 
mostly through personal experience. Information about other hazards is acquired indirectly 
through many channels such as statements from experts, risk managers etc. through the mass 
media. By mass media this thesis means information channels such as TV, radio, internet and 
newspapers which are used by different parties for information or debate (e.g. about a 
pandemic risk) for conveying messages to the general public. In this thesis the main focus is 
on the relationship between media and risk perception within health related situations. It is 
worth mentioning, however, that a review of research on risk perception and media by 
Wåhlberg and Sjöberg (2000) found that the strength of the influence of media on risk 
perception is still poorly understood and that the effect is probably not a strong factor in risk 
perception. One of the main effects they found was one of availability, and more information 
(good or bad) increases perceived risk. These results were based on observations of sheer 
amount of media coverage however, and the size of the effect could not be fully stated. 
However, the trend was clear: public perception of risk vary in accordance with media 
coverage (Wåhlberg & Sjöberg, 2000). It is therefore important, when it comes to central 
risks, to maintain the flow of information to the public so that they do not unfavorably lower 
their risk estimates.  
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The relationship between mass media output and risk perception within a health 
context should not be understated. Today more than ever, health is one of the topics most 
frequently covered by the mass media (Carducci, Alfani, Sassi, Cinini, & Calamusa, 2011). 
We live in a time with increased access to information, especially through the internet, but 
also from more traditional means such as TV, radio and newspapers. In accordance with 
Ackerson and Viswanath (2010), and May (2005), the media have grown to be an important 
source of health information for the general public. The effect of this trend, however, is not 
necessarily entirely positive (or negative).  
Research on media coverage of health related risks has found that the media’s focus 
upon sensational/newsworthy stories tend to increase and distort public perception of the risk 
in question (May, 2005). The media do in some cases focus upon health risks 
disproportionally to their public health effect (Ackerson & Viswanath, 2010). Ackerson and 
Viswanath (2010) found that the media in Massachusetts, USA, focused equally on eastern 
equine encephalitis (EEE), a virus transmitted from fleas to humans, to that of cancer, even 
though EEE has a lower incidence rate than cancer and a lesser health impact. The effect on 
public risk perception due to media coverage was more likely an elevated perception of the 
EEE risk and a perception of risk from EEE and cancer disproportionate to the population 
health impact (Ackerson & Viswanath, 2010). Even among those over 45 which are at greater 
risk from cancer than those 44 and younger.  
The media’s portrayal of the EEE virus was characterized to attract attention. It 
focused upon the novelty of the disease cases, highlighted the unusual nature of the disease 
risk and emphasized the danger of death from the disease (Ackerson & Viswanath, 2010). 
Similar findings are reported by May (2005). The media’s focus upon a link between autism 
and the mandatory MMR vaccine (against measles, mumps and rubella) for children in USA 
led to an increase in perceived risk from the vaccine by the children’s parents and an increase 
in exempting children from the vaccine by the parents (e.g. 59% increase in Colorado from 
1987 to 1998). The link was rejected in the medical literature and the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM). According to May (2005), the consequences are mainly attributed to the media 
because they made the story sensational/newsworthy and misleading by focusing upon the 
most serious, though statistically extremely low, risks from the vaccine. The news was also 
personalized since everyone in the target group was affected (the vaccine was mandatory for 
all children) making the story relevant for all parents. May (2005) also stated that the problem 
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was exacerbated because most contemporary parents had not experienced an epidemic which 
may confirm the success of the vaccination program.  
The abovementioned results show that the media is an important source of health 
information for the general public and that it may easily distort and unfavorably increase 
public risk perception. However, the negative view of the media portrayed by Ackerson and 
Viswanath, (2010) and May (2005) is somewhat misleading. Research by Carducci, and 
colleagues (2011) found that media that focus on food related hazards led to an increase in 
people changing their food habits, at least temporarily, as a consequence. The respondents 
showed greater awareness of different risks associated with food due to the media coverage. 
Again, this shows that the mass media is an important source of health information for the 
general public and that public risk perception, to a degree, is reflecting what the media 
focuses on.  
An increase in more “correct” risk perception can be facilitated if the health authorities 
tailor their messages for their intended audience to maximize the chance of communicating 
the message intended (Ackerson & Viswanath, 2010; May, 2005). Research by Agha (2010) 
found that when health authorities in Kenya, in a health campaign against HIV/AIDS, 
tailored
3
 their messages of increased condom use to prevent HIV/AIDS to their intended 
audience (Kenyans between ages 15-39) they met with greater success than the more generic 
messages. The tailored message promoted the condom Trust as positive lifestyle and marketed 
it as “cool” and contemporary. The generic message was developed to induce uncertainty/fear 
about the consequences of not using a condom. Agha’s (2010) results showed that the tailored 
message increased personal risk perception. People with high exposure to the tailored 
message were twice as likely as those with no exposure to report that they were at high risk of 
acquiring HIV/AIDS. Surprisingly those highly exposed to the generic message were less 
likely to feel at risk from HIV than those who were not exposed. Agha (2010) attributed this 
result to its design, that is, promoting uncertainty and fear as less effective in promoting 
behavioral changes. 
Summarizing media: The abovementioned research shows the importance of the mass 
media, both as a source for information to the general public and as a useful tool for risk 
                                                 
3
 Agha (2010) uses the word branding. The condom was given the brand name Trust and the subsequent 
communication in the health campaign was formed around that brand. In essence the communication was 
tailored to its intended audience and the brand name the symbol. For all intents and purposes the branding 
approach is the same as tailoring: to construct messages to its target audience as to maximize the chance of 
communicating the message intended. 
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communication in health promoting campaigns. Information portrayed in the mass media 
should be well thought trough and preferably tailored to its target audience so the intended 
messages are communicated. The aspect of tailoring will be further explored in the section on 
mental modeling. 
 
2.3.5 Risk perception conclusion 
Risk perception is complex and many factors influence it. The factors listed here are 
those we deem to be central for risk management in a health related situation and are not 
exhaustive. Different situations will likely include other factors to explain perceived risk. The 
strength of the factors mentioned here is that they can be measured and it is psychometrically 
sound to do so. The measured strength of the factors will in turn have consequences in 
ensuring effective risk communication. For example, should knowledge be lacking then the 
public needs to be informed about the risks. However, a risk rated as high by the 
psychometric paradigm, when the public has no prior experience and little trust in the risk 
manager, would require considerable risk communication efforts to mitigate. Vice versa, an 
opposite low risk rating would need another risk communication approach to mitigate (e.g. to 
increase public awareness of the risk).  
 
2.4 What do people need to know? The ELM model and the role of mental modeling 
This section of the theory chapter will focus upon the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) 
and the mental modeling approach to risk communication. The ELM model will be described 
first and then the mental model approach.  
 
2.4.1 The ELM model 
The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion
4
 (ELM) is a dual processing model 
developed by Petty and Cacioppo in 1980’s (see also Petty, Cacioppo, Stratham & Priester, 
2005; Petty, Barden & Wheeler, 2009). Its main function is to explain how people process 
information that they are presented with. How the information is processed will influence the 
                                                 
4
 For a figure of the model see Appendix A 
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recipient’s attitude towards the position advocated by the source. Attitude again shapes 
behavior (Petty et al., 2009). In this context it is of interest to incorporate the ELM model 
because it suggests an approach to information processing that could be of great importance 
for how to present information about a pandemic risk situation.  
 
The central and peripheral routes to persuasion 
The ELM model is based upon the assumption that people gain from learning correct 
attitudes and beliefs since these will prove helpful for the individual in getting through life 
(Petty et al., 2005). For example, if people thought highly of shoddy products they would be 
in trouble. On this assumption the ELM model describes two routes which organize and 
process information into an attitude; meaning either keeping the original attitude or change 
the attitude into an altered one. The two routes are called central and peripheral. 
The central route involves careful consideration of the relevant information in the 
message. The recipient of the information is in a motivated and able state ready to relate the 
relevant information to previous stored knowledge and to generate new implications of the 
information. This type of thinking is called elaboration and is at the core of the central route 
of persuasion. The more the individual elaborates the more he/she uses the central route. Both 
positive and/or negative attributes of the received information on the source’s advocated 
position are evaluated. The ultimate goal for this cognitive effort is to determine if the 
position taken by the source has any merit. In short, should the recipient generate a negative 
interpretation towards the persuasion effort he/she will most likely not change his/her initial 
attitude. However, should it be positive he/she will most likely change the initial attitude 
towards the views of the message (Petty et al., 2005; Petty et al., 2009).  
In contrast, if the recipient is in a non-motivated and/or non-able state he or she may 
use the peripheral route of processing. Rather than using a lot of cognitive effort in 
determining the validity of the argument(s) in a message the person will rather make use of 
simple cues (e.g. attractiveness of the source, experts are usually correct, etc.) in determining 
if they agree or not (Petty et al., 2005; Petty et al., 2009). In short, the use of this route 
involves processes requiring little thought about the issue-relevant information in forming an 
opinion about the message or in changing ones behavior (Petty et al., 2009).  
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It is important to note that an individual rarely makes use of just the central or the 
peripheral route (Petty et al., 2009). According to Petty and colleagues (2009) persuasion 
occurs along an elaboration continuum. The continuum goes from processes requiring a lot of 
consideration (e.g. listing pros and cons in making a decision) to those requiring a modest 
amount of effort (e.g. counting arguments) to those requiring little to no effort/thinking (e.g. 
heuristics etc. that are outside of awareness). So both the central and peripheral routes 
influence attitudes simultaneously along the continuum. However, increase in the elaboration 
(thoughts that require more consideration) increases the likelihood that the central route of 
processing will dominate the content of attitudes over the more peripheral or superfluous 
ones. 
 
Motivation and ability 
There are two necessary conditions advocated by Petty and colleagues (2009) which 
affect the elaboration likelihood, and hence the use of the central route to process information, 
namely motivation and ability. Motivation relates to the individual’s rather conscious 
intentions and goals in scrutinizing a message and its content while ability relates to whether 
the individual has the necessary skills, knowledge and opportunity to evaluate the message 
and its content. As such there are a number of situational and dispositional variables which 
affect motivation and ability.  
When people are motivated and able to follow the central route (meaning e.g. that they 
are interested in the message and have sufficient time for careful consideration) they carefully 
appraise the extent to which the message reflects the true merits of the person, object, or issue 
under consideration. Should the individual be either not motivated or not able, or both, this 
will lead to the use of the peripheral route (Petty et al., 2005; Petty et al., 2009). It can be 
deducted from this presentation that the choice of processing route differs from individual to 
individual and from situation to situation. Thus a message that is processed by the central 
route by one individual might be processed by the peripheral route by another. 
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Consequences from use of the different routes  
Attitude changes due to central processing tend to have different consequences and 
properties than those based on peripheral processing (Petty et al., 2005; Petty et al., 2009). In 
general terms, the central route tends to elicit stronger attitude changes than the peripheral 
ones. Strength does not mean an increase in the extremity of the attitude, but how persistent it 
is. Strong attitudes tend to endure over time and are resistant to change when challenged with 
contrary information (Petty et al., 2009). In addition, people who have changed their attitude 
due to central route processing are more likely to act on them (change their behavior) 
(Krosnick & Petty, 1995, as cited in Petty et. al., 2009). The strength of the attitude stems 
from the thoughts of the message being linked to internal knowledge to the information 
presented (Petty et al., 2005). Lastly, if the individuals have a high degree of confidence in the 
thoughts generated through central route processing (i.e. little reason to doubt the thoughts) 
then the thoughts are more likely to determine their attitude (Petty, Brinõl & Tormala, 2002). 
However, the variables that determine confidence are likely many, ranging from individual 
variables, heuristics and situational factors (Petty et al., 2002). Within the constraints of this 
thesis the situational factors are most relevant, meaning credibility of the information source 
in instilling confidence (such as expert statements or trust). 
It is important to note, however, that the peripheral route might also lead to attitude 
change. The difference being that the attitudes are not as durable as those promoted by the 
central route. The consequence of this is that the attitude might have lesser chance of leading 
to sustained behavioral change due to its vulnerability to contrary information, making them 
susceptible to change of attitude. Its weakness stems from unfavorable thoughts and/or low 
confidence in them (Petty et al., 2009). 
 
2.4.2 Mental modeling theory 
 As shown in the risk perception chapter by Agha’s (2010) research, health promoting 
campaigns show greater effect when the message is tailored to its intended audience. 
According to Fischhoff (1989) and Morgan et al. (2002) effective risk communication must 
focus upon the gap between what people need to know and also on what they yet do not 
know. Such information needs can only be fully addressed by conducting a systematic 
analysis of public beliefs and knowledge gaps in relation to the risk they face. Only asking 
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technical experts what the public should be told would be neglecting the empirical evaluation 
of the communication by the individuals who will use it. This, in turn, will likely lead to those 
communicating the risk having a lack of either the knowledge or the needs of the intended 
audience (Morgan, et. al. 2002).  
Mental modeling is a cognitive approach which, in risk research, seeks to identify 
accurate and inaccurate beliefs about a hazard that are held by the target population 
(Breakwell, 2007). As such it seeks to identify the gap between what people need to know but 
as of yet do not. The mental modeling approach to risk communication assumes that the 
audience of a message, by definition, lacks a complete understanding of its subject matter 
(Morgan et. al., 2002). However, the audience will over time accumulate at least some 
relevant beliefs about the subject matter which will be used in interpreting the 
communication. If judgments about the risk are needed they will assemble their different 
beliefs into a mental model which is used to reach conclusions (e.g. who manages the risk, 
how can it be controlled) (Morgan et al., 2002). It is important to note that the use of the word 
“model” is a metaphorical explanation of the general principles people use in judging how 
things interact with one another in a complicated situation. Thus “model” is not meant as a 
formal interpretation of strict mapping of elements in the model or fixed operations for 
combining those elements.  
Morgan et al. (2002) chose to summarize beliefs in influence diagrams since they 
allow (i) the integration of different forms of expertise and (ii) involve assessment of the 
importance of different facts. See Appendix B for an illustration of influence diagrams. The 
mental model approach to risk communication suggested by Morgan and colleagues (2002) 
contains five steps in systematic order. A short description of the steps follows. 
 
Step 1: Create an expert model 
The first step entails producing a summary of the scientific knowledge which details 
the processes of the nature and magnitude of the risk (Morgan et al., 2002). Such information 
will mostly come from experts within the scientific field(s) relevant for the specific risk. 
However, experts are often in possession of knowledge that most people do not need to know, 
or it is to peripheral for the specific risk, and therefore irrelevant for risk communication 
(Morgan et al., 2002). Morgan and colleagues (2002) state that decisions on what can be done 
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about the risk (what to inform about) need to be established first. This may be done in part in 
collaboration with the experts one consults, who have expert knowledge about risk mitigation. 
Once the knowledge summary is defined it should guide the expert model development. It is 
important to note that an expert model does not necessarily mean knowledge which resides in 
one expert. Mostly the model will be constructed upon the knowledge of several experts. The 
accumulated expert knowledge will be pooled into the creation of a single description of the 
risk, meaning an influence diagram (Morgan et al., 2002).  
There are several strategies which can be used for developing an expert influence 
diagram. What strategy to use is largely based upon an evaluation of what is possible and 
most practical in the given setting (Morgan et al., 2002 section 3.2. give four generic 
strategies which can be used alone or combined). The basis is the same however. To 
accumulate expert knowledge into a single description requires open contact with experts 
through interviews. Complete diagrams start as simple ideas and develop as more knowledge 
is incorporated into it. The development of a full influence diagram requires repeated 
iterations with multiple experts (Morgan et.al., 2002). In other words, one starts with 
interviewing one or more experts (alone or together). The initial knowledge will form the 
basis of the model. More knowledge will be attributed to the model through repeated reviews 
of the model by technical experts with different perspectives so that balance and 
authoritativeness are assured. If done repeatedly one will eventually reach a point where there 
is nothing more to add to the model. What also can be deducted from this presentation is that 
the expert model is a qualitative one. 
 
Step 2: Conduct mental models interviews  
The next step is to extract public beliefs about the hazard. Morgan and colleagues 
(2002) advice the use of open-ended interviews so that such beliefs can be expressed in the 
respondents’ own terms. This approach is advised on the ground that the public mental model 
is diverse and not as systematic as the one of the experts. It can be that they conceptualize the 
model components similarly or differently. The interview protocol will be based upon the 
influence diagram so that relevant topics can be covered. In other words, one starts the 
interview very generally and focuses the questions on more detail as the interview develops. 
The focus will be on topics and concepts that the subject has touched on, and if the subject has 
not touched on topics in the influence diagram these will not be addressed. This process is 
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dependent upon skilled interviewers which can extract beliefs and concepts from the subjects 
without inducing beliefs in them, especially when asking follow up questions. The question 
then remains on what to do with matters untouched but found in the diagram? Morgan and 
colleagues (2002) give some strategies for following up untouched subject matters; hopefully 
without inducing beliefs in the subject and, for the skilled interviewer, these may be worth 
looking into.  
The number of respondents needed depends on the type of population one is interested 
in. On a national level Morgan et al. (2002) recommend structured surveys. If one wishes to 
address misconception held by 10% of the population then they recommend 20-30 interviews. 
The reason for this is because when one reaches 20 – 30 interviews the number of concepts 
introduced to the mental model tend to level out with few to none new concepts being 
introduced. Overall however, what is important is to continue with interviews until one 
reaches a point wherein few to no new concepts are introduced. The numbers given by 
Morgan and colleagues (2002) should be considered as instructional. 
After the interviews are collected the answers are coded using the expert model as a 
template. Those that cannot be coded within the expert model are assigned new categories. 
Major patterns, and weighing of the different topics, can be done simply by using the 
frequency with which the subjects talked about the topic. More complex analyses look at 
patterns of these frequencies (Morgan et al., 2002). The main point during the analysis is to 
outline the public mental model, this means that those beliefs that the public have, but the 
experts do not, are relevant and included in the model. Other times the lay public may 
generate knowledge which is relevant for the expert model and therefore is included there 
(Morgan et al., 2002). When the coding scheme has been developed Morgan and colleagues 
(2002) recommend it should be tested so the results are shown to be reproducible. They report 
that two to three people following the same coding instructions, and independently coding the 
same transcript, were found to agree two-thirds of the time, which is better than could be 
expected from chance (Morgan et al., 2002). 
 
Step 3: Conduct structured initial interviews 
This step entails the creation of a confirmatory questionnaire wherein the questions 
capture the public beliefs found in the open interviews and the expert model and the 
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subsequent comparison between them. The questionnaire is administered to large groups, 
representing the intended audience, in order to estimate the most prevalent beliefs in the 
population (Morgan et al., 2002). Estimation of beliefs allows the risk communicator to 
identify widely spread correct beliefs on which the message can be built. Further, this work 
will identify misconceptions that need to be addressed. If there are specific issues suggested in 
the public mental model that are not clarified, then they may also be addressed here (e.g. 
confused use of terms like climate and weather) (Morgan et al., 2002). Invariably the 
information one manages to extract from the questionnaire depends upon the quality of its 
construction. Giving a full detailing of this process falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
Should the reader want more specific information about this process Morgan and colleagues 
(2002) give a description in chapter 5, as well as two case examples in chapter 7 and 8. 
  
Step 4: Draft risk communication  
Results from the interviews and questionnaire will identify many misconceptions and 
gaps in lay people knowledge about a specific risk. Priorities must be set to cover the gaps 
deemed most important. Therefore communications focus on the facts that have the greatest 
impact upon the greatest portion of the audience (Morgan et al. 2002). As such the process of 
what message content to choose will depend on the given situation. For example, Morgan and 
colleagues (2002) found in one their studies the misconception that radon can permanently 
contaminate a house. People who held that belief could forgo to test their house for radon 
since it was viewed as unnecessary (since they could do nothing about it) and they therefore 
felt better of not knowing. A clarification of the misconception would then be the first step 
since uncorrected it could undermine the value of more correct knowledge. That is, one has to 
explain that the radon would not be a problem once the influx is stopped. Even though there 
were other examples of public misunderstandings, such as radon coming from decaying 
garbage, these were ignored since they were either not prioritized or could be solved 
indirectly through the clarification of other misconceptions.  
 The process of drafting the risk communication starts with the selection of key 
concepts that one wishes to address. A logical organization of principles is needed so people 
can make sense of the message content and integrate it into their existing mental model 
(Morgan, et al., 2002). This requires knowledge of how the organization of text may enhance 
or hinder the reader’s ability to understand and remember the message content. People are 
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different however, some may read the whole text, others may read only pieces of it and some 
may go wanting for more details. Multiple methods are needed to address different reading 
styles. Morgan and colleagues (2002) state that a hierarchical organization of information is 
useful for simple messages like a brochure. More complex topics would require hypertext for 
flexible hierarchical organization (only available on computers). Devices such as diagrams, 
drawings, pictures and so on may help the reader and make the brochure more appealing. Use 
of a “myth-fact” section, presenting each incorrect belief, followed by the correct one, 
complimented with an explanation designed to help readers to revise and redesign their 
mental models is also promoted. The presentation of information should follow scientifically 
proven methods that help in matching the new information to the reader’s internal 
representation on the subject matter. 
The last step involves making a first draft of the message content based upon the list of 
key concepts and organized principles acquired. This should preferably be done by a technical 
expert who understands the technical issues and has a gift for writing to the lay public so the 
factual content is correct and the writing understandable. According to Morgan and colleagues 
(2002, p. 100) “a communication must be clear, interesting, and useful to lay readers, as well 
as balanced, correct, and understandable to technical experts”. The most common problem 
relates to issues involving scientific controversy or uncertainty. These subject areas should be 
leveled and balanced in such a way that the readers can understand where the positions stand 
so they can draw their own conclusions. In other words, make all sides of the controversies 
and uncertainties understandable and correctly presented so the readers have a basis to reach 
their own conclusion. “Correct” in this context mean, that all sides of a controversy should 
confirm the statement presented as correct.  
  
Step 5: Evaluating communication  
The last step entails testing and refinement of the communication draft. According to 
Morgan and colleagues (2002) getting the design of the risk message correct the first time is a 
rarity and refinement of the message content is more often than not a necessity to make the 
material more accessible. This invariably means getting an empirical evaluation of the 
message content by the target audience and/or by other specialists less involved in the 
communication design. The feedback from the empirical evaluation will highlight what is 
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needed or should be removed/altered to increase the effect of the message content, that is, 
making the information more correct, readable and easy to understand.  
  
2.4.3 Use of the model in this thesis 
 The process of constructing, implementing and evaluating mental models is time 
consuming and complex. A communications approach based upon mental modeling seeks to 
convey a comprehensive picture of the process of creating a picture of and controlling a risk 
(Fischhoff, Bostrom & Quadrel, 1993). According to Fischhoff and colleagues (1993, p. 197) 
“bridging the gap between lay mental models and expert models would require adding 
missing concepts, correcting mistakes, strengthening correct beliefs and deemphasizing 
peripheral ones”. The mental model approach presented by Morgan and colleagues (2002) 
seeks to do so in a systematic manner. What is presented of this approach in the thesis is a 
general outline of the mental model approach so its use can be discussed as a relevant tool in 
outlining expert and public knowledge. Based on that, constructs of an idea of what lay public 
needs to know can be used and, as a consequence of addressing the discrepancies through 
communication, recipients can hopefully act on it. The mental model approach is best suited 
for the preparation of explanatory brochures or other similar channels of communication 
(Fischhoff et al., 1993). The examples by Morgan and colleagues (2002) are all related to the 
use of such forms of media. Although the thesis focuses upon risk communication from 
authorities on a societal level, the approach of mental modeling can be used in the work 
preparing an information campaign.  
 
2.5 Legal concerns and the RISCOM model of transparency 
There is a sharp distinction between what the public need to know and what they have the 
legal right to know. The former entails a judgment of public information need by the one 
wanting to convey a message. The latter entails a compulsory action written in law which has 
to be followed by the communicator. The legal rights of the public does not only encompass a 
right to information about a risk but also for participation in the decision process regarding, 
for example, environmental hazards. An arena is thus needed that facilitates participation. 
Such an arena could also be able to capture what the public wants to know. Thus, legal rights 
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will be presented first and the RISCOM model of transparency second as a suggestion for a 
risk communication arena.  
 
2.5.1 Legal aspects of risk communication 
Lessons learned from previous accidents have shown that there is a need for a legal 
framework in the field of risk communication. Rather than information sharing being a 
recommendation of conduct, it is in many cases now a legal requirement. Accidents, such as 
the Seveso chemical accident in Italy in 1976 firmly showed the need for rights of access to 
and provision of information for the public at risk. This has led to the granting of public rights 
regarding access to and provision of information. Specific requirements for improving the 
information and risk mitigation measures related to potential major accidents in certain 
industrial activities are covered by the Seveso Directive from 1982, reviewed in 1996 
(European Commission, 2012a). 
A later and more comprehensive detailing of public rights to information, with regard 
to environmental issues, is given by UNECE (1998), also known as the Aarhus convention. 
UNECE (1998) states that any citizen has the right to: (i) receive environmental information 
that is held by the public authorities, (ii) to participate in environmental decision-making and 
(iii) to review procedures and to challenge public decisions that have been made without 
respecting the two aforementioned rights. According to European Commission (2012b) the 
environmental information in the Aarhus convention includes: “information on the state of the 
environment, but also on policies or measures taken, or on the state of human health and 
safety where this can be affected by the state of the environment” (European Commission, 
2012b). 
The question: should we inform the public? and, should they be allowed to participate 
in the decision making process? is not up to debate, the public have a legal right to 
information and participation. Further the authorities are legally obliged to pro-actively 
disseminate any environmental information in their possession, and to arrange an arena that 
enables the stakeholders to comment on issues regarding the environment which are to be 
taken into account in the decision-making process. Information has to be provided on the final 
decision and the reasons for it (UNECE, 1998) 
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2.5.2 The RISCOM model of transparency 
As highlighted above, today’s risk manager is sometimes required to create an arena of 
discourse in which the public is included in the decision process. The arena should include the 
relevant stakeholders, the risk manager(s) and the experts in the field(s) related to the specific 
hazard under debate. All opinions in such an arena are considered legitimate (Fischhoff, 
1989). Such an arena is open to complex societal issues which have a tendency to divide 
rather than unite various parties. It is impossible for any single person, experts included, to 
understand all implications of a risk situation. Debates may last for years with little 
progression, understanding or resolution unless an effort is made to thoroughly discuss the 
matter (Andersson, Drottz-Sjöberg, Espejo, Fleming, & Wene 2006). Andersson and his 
colleagues (2006) state that as the issues are discussed in public, various points of view tend 
to crystallize. Crystallized frames of thinking include interests, emotions, values, cognitive 
styles and ingrained ways of thinking which often cause groups to frame issues solely by 
defining what the issues really are about for them. The established frame of thinking affects 
what information is considered relevant and what is not. This way of reasoning often leads to 
unprofitable discussion, premature closure in framing policy issues, and lack of attention to 
minority views. Such narrow framing, which may be political or technical, should therefore 
be avoided.  
Procedures are needed that allow a wide range of participants to take part, representing 
diverse perspectives on the issue at hand (Andersson et al., 2006). Essential to this process 
should be the stimulation of awareness of the existing framing, as well as the reframing of 
issues into a broader framework. For the RISCOM model of transparency this is an essential 
part of the work (Andersson et al., 2006). The model is defined as ”a theoretical framework 
that incorporates the simultaneous communication of scientific facts or expertise information, 
social norms and personal characteristics” (Drottz-Sjöberg, 2012, p. 764). Andersson and 
colleagues developed the model in the 1990’s and it has been tested in European Union 
projects in the 2000’s (Drottz-Sjöberg, 2012).  
The model is based upon the theory of communicative action developed by Jürgen 
Habermas in the 1980’s (Andersson, 2006). The theory stipulates that if a statement is to be 
communicative it has to be true, right and truthful. A statement of truth is based upon claims 
of validity that may be challenged (e.g. scientific methods and technology). Rightness means 
that the statement is legitimate in its social context (e.g. societal norms, practical interests). 
Truthfulness means that an actor needs to be honest or “authentic” (e.g. consistency between 
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words and action) (Andersson et al., 2006; Drottz-Sjöberg, 2012). This approach to dialogue, 
as a means of clarifying understandings between the actors follows a set of guidelines on the 
way discussions are conducted (Andersson et al., 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The RISCOM model of transparency. Adapted from Drottz-Sjöberg (2012). 
 
 Figure 1 illustrates the three claims of the RISCOM model (adapted from Drottz-
Sjöberg, 2012). The arena wherein the discussions are held allows questions regarding the 
stakeholders’ claims to truth, legitimacy and authenticity. The challenges are meant to lead to 
reflection and understanding of claims (these are exemplified in the brackets). Claims to truth 
may be challenged in the RISCOM arena (is this true?) and technical and scientific issues can 
be clarified by scientific methods (are we doing the things right?). Claims of legitimacy 
relates to the roles and statues of the involved, as well as to normative issues on what is 
Legitimacy 
- Social world 
- “Are we doing the right things?” 
 
Truth/efficiency 
- Objective world 
- Scientific methods and technology 
- “Are we doing things right?” 
 
Authenticity 
- Personal integrity/organizational identity 
- No hidden agenda? 
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considered fair and acceptable in society (are we doing the right thing?). Lastly, authenticity 
is a double claim to truthfulness: that a speaker is true to the dialogue partners and also 
towards himself. (A speaker presents true facts and reflect around his own, and the 
organizations, values and honestly reflect these). It implies that personal integrity is shown 
through consistency between words and action. If a person considers another person, or, for 
example, an authority or implementor, as authentic (truthful/honest) it is more likely that trust 
is developed regarding the communicators views and decisions (Andersson et al., 2006). 
The goal of the model is to achieve transparency of the decision making process. This 
goes beyond simply questioning a proponent’s use or understanding of science and 
technology, and all aspects of the triangle need to be illuminated (Andersson et al., 2006). The 
purpose of transparency is to clarify effectiveness (are we doing the right thing?). 
Transparency is achieved as an outcome of an ongoing learning process which is contingent 
upon the establishment of various modes of interaction between an organization and relevant 
stakeholders. Such contacts will enhance what Andersson and colleagues (2006) call 
stretching. The concept entails that any proponent is challenged with critical questions from 
different perspectives by the other stakeholders and that the “stretching” will increase the 
awareness of all involved. Increased awareness of the others’ views and concerns may lead to 
a re-examination and possible reformulation of objectives and performance. Stretching will 
thus make the views and concerns of the dialogue partners more accessible and consistent 
with each other (Andersson et al., 2006). In more technical terms the participants need to 
“stretch” their own positions regarding, for example, to meet requirements for technical 
explanations, proof of authenticity, and legitimacy of actions (Drottz-Sjöberg, 2012). 
When applying the model Andersson and Wene (2006) state that a reference group is 
needed. The reference group is build upon stakeholder participation and the group is 
established by formal agreement between the participants. Its role is to agree on the structure 
of the communication process such as the level of meaningful debate. The different levels of 
meaningful debate will vary from local (e.g. communities), national (e.g. health policy) and 
wider levels of social concern (e.g. role of multinational parties). The three components of the 
RISCOM model will have different meanings at separate societal levels (Andersson et al., 
2006). The reference group will also agree on other overall process matters such as planning 
of seminars, hearings etc. (Drottz-Sjöberg, 2012).  
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When the reference group has been established and the overall structure agreed upon 
the second phase of communication activities (e.g. a hearing or seminar) may commence 
(Drottz-Sjöberg, 2012).  These activities follow a tailored format and should be as public as 
possible, preferably with media coverage. The last phase is documentation and dissemination 
of results. Recommendations to the decision-makers are not made; the sole aim of using the 
model is to create an arena where all stakeholders leave with increased awareness and 
learning. The normal political system takes over the actual decision-making (Drottz-Sjöberg, 
2012). 
The RISCOM model advocates the use of a process guardian with independent 
resources, societal trust, and authenticity to secure process integrity (Andersson et al., 2006; 
Drottz-Sjöberg, 2012). The goal is to prevent potential manipulation by concealed strategic 
action from any of the dialogue partners. Who the guardian should be is not explicitly stated 
but Andersson and Wene (2006) found that it is often the chair person of the reference group 
which assumes this role. So the guardian could be a person, a group or an organization agreed 
upon by the reference group. 
 
2.6 How do we say it? Lessons learned from risk communication history  
Risk communication has undergone considerable changes from its humble beginnings. Baruch 
Fischhoff (1995) gives a short speculative (i.e. unsubstantiated empirically) summary of risk 
communication history in his review of twenty years of risk communication research and 
practice. According to Fischhoff (1995), the period from 1975 to 1995 has undergone eight 
stages, each stage building upon the previous stage. The development stages are presented 
below cited from Fischhoff (1995, p. 138). 
1. All we have to do is get the numbers right 
2. All we have to do is tell them the numbers 
3. All we have to do is explain what we mean by the numbers 
4. All we have to do is show them that they’ve accepted similar risks in the past 
5. All we have to do is show them that it’s a good deal for them 
6. All we have to do is treat them nice 
7. All we have to do is make them partners 
8. All of the above 
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In Fischhoff’s (1995) outline of risk communication history he outlines the trend from 
experts thinking no communication is necessary, to one-way communication based upon 
simple assumptions of the public, to the modern view involving two-way communication and 
public participation. There are lessons to be learned from history on how to present a message 
and those are outlined below. 
Presenting numbers: Firstly there is a need for a clear and concise way of presenting 
the numbers from expert risk assessments. However, just telling the numbers to the public 
will likely just serve to reflect the distance between the analysts and its audience (Fischhoff, 
1995). According to Fischhoff (1995) the communicator (early on the experts) will easily be 
perceived as out of touch with the public and thereby undermine the own credibility. Further, 
if the numbers give no meaning the recipients will likely be confused and add some of their 
uncertainty to that expressed by the analysts adjusting their risk estimates up or down to 
accommodate likely biases. It may also be seen as a deliberate act of trying to cloud the 
subject matter, even if this is not intended (Fischhoff, 1995). If the numbers cannot explain 
the risk in themselves, they have to be better explained as to what they mean. However, this 
entails putting a subjective evaluation into the meaning of the numbers. There may be 
disagreement between those experts who judge the probability of a risk as small versus those 
who judge it as high (e.g. greenhouse warning) (Fischhoff, 1995). Controversy might create 
uncertainty as to which explanation is correct and the public will be hard pressed on which 
expert is right. To smooth the process clear communication on the numbers that matter is 
advised (Fischhoff, 1995).  
Risk is more than numbers: Numbers can only go so far. It is of course important to 
explain what one-in-a-million chance actually means, however clear communication entails a 
focused attention on the relevant subject matter. The communicator should not give too much 
information, but neither too little. In other words, tell the people what they need to know. This 
requires an informed understanding of what the public wants to know (e.g. some may want 
numbers; other may want to know how the industrial factory works etc.) (Fischhoff, 1995). 
Details of what the public wants to know could have been obtained using the mental modeling 
or RISCOM model approaches described above. Trying to suggest “acceptable risk” by 
showing the public that they have faced similar risk before which are now accepted is not a 
recommended approach. The parental approach of saying “the risk from the current hazard X 
is not greater than hazard Y which you have accepted” will easily be perceived as 
condescending by the public (Fischhoff, 1995). The presentation of the message is therefore 
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required to frame it in an attractive manner. For example, describing a health program in 
terms of lives that will be saved, rather than lives that will be lost, has been shown to increase 
the attractiveness of a message (Fischhoff, 1995). However, public views change over time 
and suspicion of manipulation may arise, even if this was not intended by the communicator.  
Presentation of the message should, with respect to correct presentation of the 
information, therefore respect and include the recipient it is meant for. Even if the message is 
perfect it may not be perceived as such by the public (Fischhoff, 1995). Questions about the 
communicator’s trustworthiness will likely be the only excuse needed to readily dismiss the 
message. To remedy this the recipients need to be treated with the respect they deserve. If 
they feel disrespected they may fear those who disenfranchise them (Fischhoff, 1995). 
However, respect will only get the communicator so far if it is not followed up with quality 
information and a real intent of action. This means including the public in the decision 
process. It also means that communicating risk is only half the message. The latter half entails 
making actions which take into account public perceptions.  
Summary: There is no easy answer on how to give information. However, the negative 
effects of saying nothing, or assuming that the public is ignorant receivers of information, are 
sufficiently documented. Messages need to be clear and concise in their presentation. 
Numbers, their meaning and attached uncertainties, will have to be explained. However, 
numbers will likely not be enough in themselves so an understanding of the public’s need for 
information is necessary so that the right type of information can be delivered. Making a 
message attractive is a difficult task which requires much reflection, especially so the message 
is not perceived as manipulative. Lastly the message needs to be respectful and inclusive 
relative the recipients. This means including those concerned in the decision process but also 
that the message has to be followed up with action. 
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3.0 Case: The A (H1N1) Pandemic 
3.1 What is a pandemic?  
According to the Norwegian national preparedness plan for pandemic influenza, commonly 
known as the pandemic plan, developed by the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care 
Services (HOD)
5
 in 2006, a pandemic is an epidemic (a disease that spreads more quickly 
than normally expected) that occurs in a large area and usually affects a large proportion of 
the population (HOD, 2006). For an influenza a pandemic can be described as “a worldwide 
epidemic, the global spread of a "new" virus (new subtype) where no, or only a few, can be 
expected to be immune against the new virus” (HOD, 2006, p. 125). During a pandemic a 
considerable part of the earth’s population can be expected to be infected during the first 
season due to the lack of herd immunity. Herd immunity is a concept wherein protection is 
achieved through the attainment of a high enough immunity in the population to the disease so 
those not immune have an extremely unlikely chance of being exposed to the virus (May, 
2005). In other words, if a high enough amount of the population is immune, then, those who 
are not, are protected due to herd immunity. The exact percentage needed to ensure herd 
immunity against a pandemic is not stated. 
Viral types: There exist three types of influenza viruses: Type A, B and C. Type A is 
the only virus associated with pandemic outbreaks and is usually found in birds and larger 
animals such as swine (Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning [DSB], 
2010)
6
. The virus types are again divided into subtypes. For example, the swine flu pandemic 
in 2009 is called A (H1N1), H1N1 marking the subtype. The Asian flu in 1957 is called A 
(H2N2). Pandemic outbreaks happen as a consequence of mutation in the virus leading to 
animal to human contamination and a large probability for human to human contamination if 
the virus continues to mutate. It is not uncommon for new A viruses to replace the existing 
seasonal virus and assume its role as a seasonal flu afterwards (HOD, 2006). It is important to 
note that the Spanish flu in 1918 was also an A (H1N1), the same as the swine flu in 2009. 
However, there are also mutations within the subtypes, called antigenic drift, which may 
determine the effect of the virus (e.g. how easily it spreads or causes fatalities) and immunity 
is not a certain outcome if one has been exposed to a similar subtype before (HOD, 2006). 
                                                 
5
 HOD stands for Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, the Norwegian name for Ministry of Health and Care 
Services. The Norwegian abbreviation will be used in the thesis. 
6
 DSB stands for Direktoratet for samfunssikkerhet og beredskap, the Norwegian name for the Directorate for 
Civil Protection and Emergency Planning. 
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 Pandemic occurrence: Since 1510 there have been 18 pandemics with varying 
intervals, usually between 10-40 years (HOD, 2006). The pandemics which affected Norway 
during the 20-century are presented in Table 1 adapted from HOD (2006)
7
.  
Table 1 Pandemics which have affected Norway during the 20-century 
Pandemic Name Type Population Sick Deaths 
The Spanish flu (1918) A(H1N1) 2 589 463 45%  
1.2 mill. 
14 676 
Let. 5.7% 
Asian flu (1957) A(H2N2) 3 507 985 15%  
1.05-2.81 mill. 
1 126 
Let. 0.32% 
Hong Kong flu (1968) A(H3N2) 3 832 192 - 
0.57-1.53 mill 
1 768 
Let. 0.46% 
Russian flu (1977) A(H1N1) 4 051 207 9%,  
364 609 
0 
Let. 0% 
Note. Based upon numbers from HOD (2006). Let. stands for lethality, meaning the mortality rate from the 
pandemic, presented here in percentage. 
What is presented in Table 2 are the most “serious” numbers resulting from a 
pandemic, meaning what is of main concern for a risk manager to focus on, namely reducing 
or stopping the number of sicknesses and deaths. There are other aspects, however, such as 
particular risk groups, possible immunity in the population and so on. These aspects also vary 
due to type of pandemic (HOD, 2006). The main point to make here is that the effect of a 
pandemic varies. Predicting the effects of a future pandemic, including sickness and fatalities, 
cannot be done with absolute certainty, a fact also highlighted by HOD (2006).   
According to HOD (2006) the most likely scenario of a future pandemic is a moderate 
pandemic (based upon the development of the pandemics during the last century). It is in this 
situation expected that 30% of the population will get infected in the course of six months and 
around half of the infected population will get sick (15% of the population). Excess mortality 
is expected at 0.1-0.4% of the sick. This means that out of 700 000 sick about 700 – 3000 
additional persons are expected to develop complications and die as compared to a normal 
winter season. The main risk management efforts during such a scenario is the focus upon 
                                                 
7
 The A (H5N1) virus (the Avian flu) is not characterized as a pandemic. The reason being that it has as of yet 
not mutated into a human to human transmittable virus thereby not resulting into what is characterized as a 
pandemic outbreak (Norwegian Institute of Public Health, 2007). However, the A (H5N1) virus may mutate to a 
human to human virus thus becoming a pandemic (see Imperial College London, 2009, for more information).  
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preventive measures to reduce spread, sickness and deaths since the most important 
community services will not be affected so hard that they are in danger of breaking down 
(HOD, 2006) 
The worst case scenario, which is less probable, expects 50% of the population to get 
infected during six months and 25% to get sick. Excess mortality is estimated at 0.4-1.1% of 
the sick meaning that of the 1.2 million sick, 5 000 – 13 000 may die in addition to fatalities 
of a normal winter season. The main concern for risk management in such a scenario is to 
maintain the most necessary community services, and through this, try to reduce sickness and 
deaths (HOD, 2006). 
 
3.2 International development 
The A (H1N1) pandemic, also known as the swine flu and new pandemic, was first registered 
in the USA at the 24
th
 of April 2009 (World Health Organization [WHO], 2009a; Aavitsland, 
2009a). Before this there had been reports from Mexico about an A (H1N1)-like flu which 
was lab-confirmed in Canada. Twelve of the lab-confirmed cases were confirmed as being 
genetically identical to the A (H1N1) virus detected in California, USA (WHO, 2009a). The 
World Health Organization (WHO) quickly announced the information to its member nations 
as a new virus with a potential for developing into a pandemic. The pandemic virus was 
continually surveyed by the WHO from the 24
th
 of April and onwards leading to a release of a 
total of 81 situation reports.  
 It is important to note that the WHO divides a pandemic into different phases ranging 
from phase 1 to phase 6. An account of these different phases is found in Appendix C adapted 
from WHO (2009b). Summarized the pandemic phases 1 - 3 predominantly entail animal 
infections with few human infections. Phase 4 is a clear signal for the need for response and 
mitigation effort. At this stage the virus has been verified to transmit from human to human 
and able to cause community-level outbreaks. A pandemic is not a foregone conclusion 
however. Phase 5 signals transmission from one nation to another, and a pandemic is now 
imminent. According to WHO (2009b) the time is short to finalize organization and 
communication; and implementation of the planned mitigation measures. Phase 6 is the 
pandemic phase and it signals that a pandemic is under way. It is “characterized by communal 
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level outbreaks in at least one other country in a different WHO region in addition to the 
criteria defined in phase 5” (WHO, 2009b, p. 25).  
The exact times of declarations of pandemic phases one to three are not stated, though 
it is known that WHO was at pandemic phase three per 26
th
 of April 2009 when the first cases 
were reported (Aavitsland, 2009a). The declaration of a transition from phase three to four 
was announced the 27
th
 of April, 2009 (WHO, 2009c), quickly followed by the declaration of 
phase five on the 29
th
 of April, 2009 (WHO, 2009d). The final phase was announced at the 
11
th
 of June, 2009, announcing a full blown pandemic showing that further spread of the 
disease was inevitable (DSB, 2010).  
In addition to the pandemic phases there are two types of periods given by the WHO 
(2009b). The post-peak period in which the pandemic disease levels have gone below 
previously peak observed levels. This period signifies that the pandemic seem to be 
decreasing, however, this does not exclude that further waves will occur. Further waves have 
been seen in previous pandemics. It can go months in between and it is the role of 
communicators to ensure that the public is prepared for the possibility of another wave 
(WHO, 2009b). In the post-pandemic period the influenza disease activity has returned to 
normal levels signifying the end of the pandemic virus and a return to phase 1. The pandemic 
virus will behave as a normal seasonal virus (WHO, 2009b).  
The post peak period will vary from country to country. Two waves were experienced 
in Norway, the biggest, signaling the post peak period, was at the beginning to late October 
2009 (DSB, 2010). The post pandemic period was reported by the WHO the 10
th
 of August 
2010 signaling the end of the pandemic (WHO, 2010).  
 
3.3 The A (H1N1) pandemic in Norway 
This part of the thesis will be divided into three main sections. The first section will shortly 
outline the Norwegian organization of the health authorities during a pandemic. The second 
section will give an account of the development of available information concerning the 
pandemic in Norway as time went on. The final section will focus on risk communication 
efforts within the periods described in section two. The reason for this division is (i) to give a 
clear presentation of what happened in Norway and how the authorities classified the risk 
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(risk assessment) and (ii) what was actually done in terms of risk communication in this 
period.  
  
3.3.1 The organization of the Norwegian health authorities regarding a pandemic 
 The Norwegian organizational structure regarding the pandemic classified the A 
(H1N1) pandemic as primarily being a challenge for the health sector (DSB, 2010). The 
central actors responsible for mitigating and communicating the risks on the national level 
were the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services (HOD), the Norwegian Health 
Directorate, and the Norwegian Institute of Public Health (FHI) (DSB, 2010).  
Risk management: As per the 27
th
 of April 2009 the Norwegian Ministry of Health and 
Care Services (HOD), in accordance with the pandemic plan (HOD, 2006), took on the role as 
the leading department of the pandemic. This involved the overall responsibility for the 
Norwegian health services, including the prevention, community health services and specialist 
health services (DSB, 2010). In accordance with the National Health Care Plan, developed by 
HOD in 2007 (see DSB, 2010), HOD delegated the responsibility for the overall coordination 
of the health sector efforts to the Norwegian Health Directorate the same day. The Health 
Directorate can, if necessary, implement measures when an emergency threatens or has 
occurred. Under normal circumstances the Health Directorate is subject to the HOD. 
However, during the pandemic the HOD assumed a more background role while the Health 
Directorate performed a more prominent role in risk management and risk communication 
(DSB, 2010). Most of the Health Directorate’s handling of the pandemic was made in close 
collaboration with the Norwegian Institute of Public Health (FHI) which is another subject of 
HOD and which, in accordance with the Disease Control Act developed in 1994 (see DSB, 
2010), has the responsibility for ensuring a necessary vaccine supply and vaccine 
preparedness as well as to survey the international epidemiological situation and to conduct 
research on the infection control area (e.g. the pandemic). According to DSB (2010) FHI was 
the main academic advisor due to its surveillance of the pandemic situation on a national and 
international basis. In summary, the Health Directorate assumed the role of main risk manager 
during the pandemic, FHI assumed the role of risk assessor and academic advisor.  
Risk communication:  The overall responsibility for the communication effort for the 
health authorities during the pandemic was the communication departments within the Health 
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Directorate and the FHI (DSB, 2010). Their responsibility involved both the strategic and the 
operative aspects of communication. According to DSB (2010) the two organisations worked 
in close collaboration throughout the process and formed a joint communication group. HOD 
had no central part in the overall communication process but was informed of the 
communication process. HOD’s main role with regard to information sharing was to 
disseminate information to the other departments (DSB, 2010). 
 
3.3.2 Risk assessments during the A (H1N1) pandemic 
The main responsibility for gathering information about the pandemic was given to the 
FHI. The institute made use of information mainly from organizations like WHO’s 
Emergency Committee, European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) and Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, USA (CDC) in the beginning. Later, as more scientific 
information was made available, such materials were also included (DSB, 2010). This 
information was collected, analyzed and summarized in reports by the FHI and given to the 
Health Directorate. The detailed analysis of the situation and its development by the FHI will 
be used to outline the risk assessments of the pandemic. The FHI compiled a total of 51 
reports, and these have been retrieved from their homepage
8
. This thesis cannot include all the 
information from all the reports. The thesis has therefore limited the inclusion of reports to 
those needed to give an overview of the main risk assessment events in Norway as they 
unfolded. The pandemic development will therefore be divided into three main periods, as 
stated by DSB (2010). 
Period one is from 24
th
 of April, when the outbreak was reported, to 10
th
 of June 2009 
when WHO declared phase 6.  
Period two is from 11
th
 of June to 15
th
 of October 2009, and the latter date signifies 
when the first shipment of vaccines arrived.  
Period three is from 16
th
 of October to 31
st
 of December 2009 which is the phase 
where vaccinations changed from prioritizing of risk groups to becoming commonly 
                                                 
8
 The main page for the reports can be accessed at 
http://www.fhi.no/eway/default.aspx?pid=233&trg=MainArea_5661&MainArea_5661=5631:0:15,5099:1:0:0:::0
:0&MainLeft_5799=5544:76458::1:5800:1:::0:0 
43 
 
available. It is also the period when the main wave of the pandemic hit the country (DSB, 
2010).  
 
3.3.3 Risk assessment categories 
The main factors that the FHI focused on can be divided into three subcategories: 
medical, background and social factors. A short description of each subcategory follows along 
with a table which illustrates the development of the factors within each subcategory over 
time as the pandemic developed. A more in-debt description of risk assessment development 
within each time period will be presented afterwards. Note that the latest risk estimate 
development is shown in each period taken from the last FHI report in that given period. No 
difference means no new information was produced that changed the existing risk estimate.  
 
Medical category 
The medical category constitutes the more clinical aspects related to the virus itself. 
The factors included in this category and their development are shown in table 2.  
Table 2 Risk assessment development regarding the factors in the medical category  
Medical 
Dimension 
Start of 
Period 1 
Period 1 
24 April – 10 June 
Period 2 
11 June – 15 
October 
Period 3 
15 October – 31 
December 
Lethality 
(how dangerous is the 
virus for the 
individual) 
 
Unknown 
Assumed 
low 
 
Observations 
abroad show 
below 0,1% 
Observations 
abroad and 
nationwide show 
between 0,1-
0,01% 
No difference 
Contagiousness 
(how easily it was 
contracted) 
Unknown 
 
Considered high 
by WHO 
Secondary attack 
rateª put at 22-
33% 
Considered high 
by WHO 
Secondary attack 
rate put at 18-
30% 
No difference 
Pathogenic Ability 
(how many, when 
infected, would 
develop symptoms) 
Unknown Unknown 
Assumed that two 
thirds of the 
infected will get 
sick 
No difference 
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Cont. table 2 Risk assessment development regarding the factors in the medical category  
Medical 
Dimension 
 
Start of 
Period 1 
Period 1 
24 April – 10 June 
Period 2 
11 June – 15 
October 
Period 3 
15 October – 31 
December 
Disease Spectrum 
(what are the normal 
and abnormal 
consequences of being 
infected, who are the 
ones getting hit the 
hardest) 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Observed as mild 
abroad with some 
cases being 
serious 
Observations 
within the nations 
show mild 
spectrum, 2% are 
serious 
No difference 
Contagious Period 
(how long a person 
was contagious) 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Put at 1 week 
Observations 
show same period 
as with normal 
flu, one week 
No difference 
Incubation Period 
(how long from 
infection until 
symptoms start 
showing) 
Unknown 
Median 2 days 
Generation time 
1,9 days 
Median 2 days 
Generation time 
2-3 days 
No difference 
Viral Genes 
(how the virus 
developed genetically) 
Unknown 
Unknown 
No change in 
genes but 
unstable 
Unknown 
No change in 
genes but 
unstable 
Unknown 
No change in 
genes but 
unstable 
Antiviral 
Sensitivity 
(is the virus sensitive 
to antiviral substances) 
Testing 
shows 
sensitivity to 
oseltamivir 
and 
zanamivir 
No difference No difference No difference 
Note. Based upon information from Aavidsland (2009a), Aavidsland (2009b), Iversen (2009), and Iversen, 
Hauge, and Løboll (2009). 
ª Secondary attack rate means how many that got sick after being exposed by a person with the disease. So if an 
infected person has contact with 10 people and two gets sick then the rate is put at 2 out of 10 meaning 20% 
(Aavitsland, 2009c). 
 
Background category 
The background category entails factors that focus upon people’s predispositions 
towards the virus, meaning certain traits which people have that make them more or less 
vulnerable to the virus. The factors included in this category and their development are shown 
in table 3.  
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Table 3  Risk assessment development regarding the factors in the background category 
Background 
Dimension 
Start of 
Period 1 
Period 1 
24 April – 10 June 
Period 2 
11 June – 15 
October 
Period 3 
15 October – 31 
December 
Immunity 
(are some individuals 
immune) 
 
Unknown 
Studies from 
USA show one 
third over 60 are 
immune. No 
immunity in 
young people 
No difference No difference 
Age 
(are some age groups 
harder hit than others) 
Unknown 
Young adults and 
children might be 
more exposed, 
unknown why 
Young adults and 
children are more 
exposed, mainly 
between 12-17 
years, unknown 
why 
No difference 
Gender 
(any difference 
between the genders) 
Unknown 
No observed 
difference 
No difference No difference 
Risk Groups 
(which groups are 
more vulnerable to the 
disease) 
Unknown 
Unknown who 
the groups are 
Risk groups 
identified: mainly 
people with 
chronic diseases 
No difference 
Note. Based upon information from Aavidsland (2009a), Aavidsland (2009b), Iversen (2009), and Iversen, 
Hauge, and Løboll (2009). 
  
Social Category 
The social category holds factors looking at the interaction between people and the 
effects which the risk of the pandemic posed. The factors included in this category and their 
development are shown in table 5. 
Table 4 Risk assessment development regarding the factors in the social category 
Social Dimension 
Start of 
Period 1 
Period 1 
24 April – 10 June 
Period 2 
11 June – 15 
October 
Period 3 
15 October – 31 
December 
Reproduction 
Numbersª 
(how many would one 
contagious person 
infect) 
Unknown 
Assumption put 
at 1,4 – 1,6 in 
Mexico but 2,3 in 
Japan 
Assumptions put 
the number at 
1,4-1,5, however 
some show 3,5  
No difference 
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Cont. table 4 Risk assessment development regarding the factors in the social category 
Social Dimension 
 
Start of 
Period 1 
Period 1 
24 April – 10 June 
Period 2 
11 June – 15 
October 
Period 3 
15 October – 31 
December 
Number infected 
(how many would get 
infected) 
Unknown 
It is unknown 
how many will 
get infected 
Based on 
previous 
experience with 
pandemics and 
measures from 
other countries 
puts assumption 
at 30% 
No difference 
Chain of infection 
(how is the virus 
transmitted) 
Unknown 
Assumed same as 
with normal flu, 
no deviation 
from this 
observedb 
No difference No difference 
Note. Based upon information from Aavitsland (2009a), Aavitsland (2009b), Iversen (2009), and Iversen, Hauge, 
and Løboll (2009). 
ª A normal seasonal flu has a reproduction number at 1.1-1.4 (Aavitsland, 2009b). 
b
 Meaning infection mainly through droplet infection and to a lesser extent through contact with other people or 
inanimate objects (Aavitsland, 2009b). 
 
 
3.3.4 Risk assessment development 
In general the tables above show that the process of risk assessment is a continuous 
process of information gathering to produce, and adjust, risk estimates. They also show how 
little is actually known at the outset of a pandemic risk, and the uncertainty which marks the 
initial risk estimates (illustrated by the period 1 estimates). As time progresses more 
information is provided which leads to more adjusted risk estimates, while also providing 
information where little was as of yet known (illustrated in period 2). Lastly, at some point in 
time, new scientific information that is made available does not change what is already 
known, but further reinforces the already existing risk estimates (illustrated in period 3 where 
nothing new is added). In summary, it takes time to produce good risk estimates. It is 
important to note that the medical factor “viral genes” was subject to continuous surveillance, 
even though the tables report no development, since it addressed the possibility of mutation in 
the A (H1N1) virus. In other words, FHI monitored if the virus developed into a more lethal 
version or became resistant to existing antiviral substances or the vaccine. As it happened the 
virus did not mutate into a more serious or resistant virus, although it was never known if it 
would.  
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What is not shown by the tables is (a) FHI’s dependency upon external sources of 
information before the pandemic reached Norway (e.g. WHO, measurements from Mexico, 
USA, etc.), (b) how information was provided piece meal requiring continuous data 
collection, analysis and adjustment of risk estimates by the FHI during the pandemic, and (c) 
how priorities of risk assessment changed between the periods to accommodate the 
development of the pandemic risk. A short summary exemplifying the development will be 
presented below for each period to highlight the process of risk assessment over time. 
 
Period 1: 24 April – 10 June 2009 
Uncertainty was a big factor at the outset, and throughout, the first time period from 
24
th
 of April to the 10
th
 of June. Regarding the factors presented in tables 2 – 4 there was 
much the Norwegian authority did not know with regard to the medical, background or social 
categories and the focus was therefore on trying to limit the introduction and spread of the 
virus through commonly known means (e.g. increased hygiene awareness, this will be further 
explained in the risk communication section) while getting more information as soon as it was 
made available (Aavitsland, 2009a). At the immediate outset of this time period all details of 
the mentioned factors were unknown. The FHI was dependent upon information and 
observations of the pandemic development abroad to provide a basis for risk assessment. An 
exception to this lack of knowledge was information regarding the spread of the virus 
provided by WHO. Per the 24
th
 of April 2009 WHO had declared pandemic level 3 
(Aavitsland, 2009a). That meant that the virus was able to transmit from animal to human, but 
there were uncertainties linked to if the virus was adapted well enough to transmit effectively 
from human to human and how easily it could do this. In other words, it was not certain that a 
pandemic was underway, but that was a possibility. 
The situation changed quickly, however, due to the observed quick spread of the virus 
leading to the WHO declaring pandemic level 4 the 27
th
 of April 2009 and stating that a 
human to human transmission had been verified which was able to cause community level 
outbreaks (WHO, 2009c). Likewise did the declaration of pandemic level 5 the 29
th
 of April 
(WHO, 2009d) show that the virus had spread into at least two countries in the WHO region 
showing that a pandemic was imminent (WHO, 2009b). In other words what was known, just 
by observing the spread, was that the virus was spreading across national borders and that it 
was difficult to contain geographically. At this stage FHI also assumes that there was little 
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immunity in the populace due to the new virus being different from other A (H1N1) viruses 
(Aavitsland, 2009c). Since there was little immunity, and therefore no herd immunity, the 
virus spread easily and quickly. 
As the pandemic situation developed abroad more information was produced which 
was analyzed and used to produce risk estimates regarding the factors mentioned above. The 
estimates were subject to continuous scepticism and “fine tuning”. A good illustration of the 
trend on how information was produced piece meal and better estimates made available is 
reflected in information about lethality. Lethality was assumed to be below 1% the 30
th
 of 
April (Aavitsland, 2009c) and was further lowered to 0.1% the 8
th
 of May (Aavitsland, 2009d) 
and was kept there out this period (until 10
th
 of June) (Aavitsland, 2009b). In terms of 
possible fatalities the change from 1% to 0.1% is great, though it should be noted that the FHI 
overestimated and they were critical to the correctness of these estimates. These numbers 
were based on observed deaths outside of Mexico, since deaths in Mexico were above the 
numbers found in other countries. The higher fatality rate in Mexico was attributed to late 
implementation of intensive care (Aavitsland, 2009b). The lethality estimate was therefore 
biased towards the actual number of fatalities in the respective countries up to that point in 
time and therefore uncertain.  
The uncertainty was also attached to the other factors. Information was made available 
by, among others, WHO and countries such as USA, Japan and Mexico to provide initial risk 
estimates to all factors except in pathogenic ability, viral genes, contagious period, number 
infected, and risk groups
9
. However, as all these estimates were based upon the observed 
general trend abroad they were inherently uncertain, something the FHI reports often admit 
along with the fact that the FHI would know more once the virus reached Norway 
(Aavitsland, 2009e). The end estimates of period one, depicted in tables 2 – 4, were, in short, 
best possible assumptions based upon information available at that time. In effect this lack of 
knowledge meant that FHI could not produce a sufficient risk assessment basis for 
communication of the pandemic risk to the public. For example, knowing that the virus 
spreads fast (as indicated by WHO and other observations abroad) but not which groups were 
at greater risk from the pandemic meant that communications of risk could mostly be aimed 
towards the public in general, not towards any specific risk groups since these were as of yet 
                                                 
9
 Note that risk groups mean identified risk groups which are more susceptible to the actual A (H1N1) virus. 
Some risk groups are known to be generally more susceptible to a common flu or pandemic virus and are 
detailed in the pandemic plan (HOD, 2006). 
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unknown (though the pandemic plan by HOD, 2006, lists what is “commonly” known to be 
risk groups in similar kinds of risks). However, this uncertainty changed during period 2 when 
the pandemic reached Norway. 
 
Period 2: 11 of June to 15 October 2009 
The 11
th
 of June started with the first two confirmed infected cases within Norway, out 
of 13 in total so far, wherein the other 11 were infected earlier when abroad (Aavitsland, 
2009f). The WHO had alerted it members the 9
th
 of June that it would declare pandemic phase 
6, that is that a pandemic is underway and cannot be contained. In other words, it is spreading 
fast because it has adapted to infecting humans on a global scale (WHO, 2009b). Pandemic 
phase 6 also meant that Norway are in obligated agreement to order 9.4 million doses of 
vaccine (two for each person in Norway
10
) against the pandemic virus from GlaxoSmithKleim 
(GSK) which was developing the vaccine (Aavitsland, 2009f). As time progressed in this 
period the virus quickly spread and where confirmed in hundreds of countries making the 
pandemic a factum. In Norway, the number of lab-confirmed infected cases increased quickly 
from roughly 300 at the 24
th
 of August to 1700 at the 15
th
 of October (Iversen, Hauge, & 
Løboll, 2009). This put the estimate of people who had got sick from the virus at around 
50 000 to 200 000 by October 15. The main wave of infected was still expected by the health 
authorities, but they did not know when this would happen.  
The main uncertainties, which the FHI focused on in this period, were how many that 
would be infected (number infected), the number who would get sick (pathogenic ability), the 
number of who would need to get hospitalized and/or need intensive care (disease spectrum) 
and finally how many that were expected to die (lethality) (Aavitsland, 2009f). The focus was 
more aimed at factors related to preventing death and serious illness than at limiting the 
spread which was seen as unavoidable. Furthermore, since the pandemic virus was within 
Norway, direct observation of the pandemic virus was now also possible. This situation is 
reflected in the risk assessment work during this period. Direct observations within the nation, 
along with more longitudinal surveys from abroad, provided more clear estimates regarding 
                                                 
10
 The decision to order two doses for each person in Norway was based on the assumption that two doses, given 
with a three week interval, was needed to achieve adequate protection of the vaccine. Actual clarification of how 
many doses which were actually needed with certainty were given in mid December (vaccination started mid 
October) wherein it was found out that one dose was enough, except for in those which were immunosuppressed 
(DSB, 2010) 
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the different factors, and provided information on those factors where information was, as of 
yet, not available at the end of period one.  
With regard to lethality the observed trend within the nation led to increased 
scepticism in the numbers received abroad, especially those from Mexico (Aavitsland, 2009f). 
Based on observations within the nation, the estimate at the 28
th
 of July put the lethality at 
0.1% to 0.01% with few children dying (Aavitsland, 2009g), although this was later also 
stated as being an overestimate. Another example is the identification of risk groups. 
Observations within the nation showed that people with chronic underlying diseases (i.e. 
asthma and other respiratory illnesses, extreme obesity, diabetes, immune deficiency, chronic 
illnesses and cancer) were at greater risk from the pandemic virus. Surveys from America 
further confirmed this observation showing that 70% of those hospitalized had an underlying 
disease (Aavitsland, 2009g). This information led to those identified as being in the risk 
groups were prioritized for vaccination when the vaccine was made available the 15
th
 of 
October (DSB, 2010).  
 
Period 3: 16 October – 31 December 2009 
In the final time period the information provided did not change the already existing 
estimates from the end of period two. Rather, the information enforced the estimates already 
available. The main events in this period were the arrival of the main pandemic wave which 
lasted from mid October to mid November 2009, and the distribution of the vaccine and the 
vaccination campaign which started at the beginning of this period. First priority of 
vaccination was the identified risk groups and health personnel, then the general populace 
(DSB, 2010). 
Of the factors listed there were still some uncertainties such as in the age gap. The 
authorities did not know clearly why young adults, mainly in their twenties, were more 
exposed, but they were (Iversen & Hauge, 2009). The information about the risk, however 
uncertain, did not change in any of the factors (see Iversen & Hauge, 2009; Blystad, Hauge, & 
Rønning, 2009; Iversen, 2009). The focus in this period therefore shifted more unto trying to 
prevent deaths and hospitalization as well as to encourage vaccination of identified risk 
groups and health personnel. Lastly, since the pandemic infection rate went down sharply, 
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risk assessments in this period went primarily from collecting new information to making an 
account of the overall pandemic development in Norway.  
 
3.3.5 Consequences of the pandemic in Norway: number infected, sick and dead 
The consequences from the pandemic, in health terms, were comparatively mild. The 
results are shown in Table 5. The numbers are copied from DSB (2010) and Statistics Norway 
(2010). 
Table 5 Consequences of the 2009 A (H1N1) pandemic in Norway 
Pandemic Name Population Infected Sick Deaths 
Swine flu, New 
influenza or A 
(H1N1) 
pandemic 
 
Ca. 4.8 million 
 
N/A 
 
Est. 900 000 
 
29 
Let. 0.003% 
Note.  Based upon numbers from DSB (2010). Population number taken from Statistics Norway (2010).  
HOD (2006) expected a mild scenario to entail 30% of the population being infected 
by the virus, half of these to get sick, and an excess mortality at 0-1 to 0.4% meaning 700-
3000 deaths. The A (H1N1) pandemic however, led to 29 registered deaths per the 7
th
 of 
January 2010 (DSB, 2010). It is estimated that around 900 000 got sick. Out of the estimated 
900 000 sick and number of fatalities this puts the lethality of the disease at 0.003%. Meaning 
that the mortality, the proportion of the population who dies, in connection with the pandemic 
was 0.6 persons per 100 000 people. This was somewhat higher than most countries in 
western Europe, including Sweden and Denmark (DSB, 2010). All in all the pandemic was 
surprisingly mild when compared to most previous pandemics and the scenarios earlier 
depicted by HOD (2006). 
 
3.3.6 Summing up risk assessment 
The A (H1N1) case has shown the many types of uncertainties that are related to fact 
finding in a real pandemic situation. It shows that it takes time to collect enough data for a 
solid basis for risk estimation; related to, for example, geographic spread and speed, type of 
virus and its severity, relevant herd immunity, incubation time, and specific risk groups. There 
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was considerable uncertainty related to how the virus would develop over time; affecting 
considerations related to expectations of severe cases, planning of health care and, not the 
least, type of adequate vaccine and vaccination procedures. 
 The case has also shown considerable world wide data collection and collaboration. 
The situation in Norway was characterized by, for example, expecting the virus from abroad, 
thus, having some time to prepare, highly alerted health authorities, continuous review of new 
information, and early ordering of vaccine.  
In the following the challenges to risk communication specifically related to the A 
(H1N1) pandemic will be outlined. The review is focused on a few selected central aspects, 
and mentions some results from data collections during the time. The previous detailed 
account of the pandemic situation, the theoretical introduction, and the next section on risk 
communication strategy during the latest pandemic, all form the basis to discuss and conclude 
about risk communication strategies in expectation of a future pandemic.  
 
3.3.7 Risk communication strategy during the pandemic 
The HOD (2006) outlined five guiding principles for risk communication for an 
eventual pandemic (HOD, 2006). These principles are based upon the WHO information 
strategy. According to DSB (2010) the Norwegian health authorities structured their 
communication strategy according to the principles outlined in the pandemic plan (HOD, 
2006) and its description of more concrete measures (detailed further down). The overall 
principle of communication in Norway during a pandemic is according to HOD (2006, p. 24-
25) to ensure: 
 Trust: To facilitate trust and to regain it if lost. It is built through a competent 
appearance, taking responsibility, being open and compassionate understanding. Lack 
of trust is stated by the pandemic plan to increase public fear and reluctance to follow 
authority advice. 
 Coordination: To give the same information regardless of who informs. Ensured 
through close collaboration with the relevant organizations which ensures quality of 
the message. Lack of coordination may lead to conflicting advice, confusion and lost 
trust. 
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 Active information: Go out early with information to establish oneself as a good source 
of information about the pandemic. Lack of proactive information may lead to others 
setting the agenda and rumours and misinformation may soar. Consequently the 
authority of the manager may be lessened. 
 Openness: Sincere, easy to understand and concrete information. Meaning to limit 
information to what is necessary and to be honest about what one doesn’t know. 
Openness may give the public insight into how information is gathered, risks assessed 
and decisions made. Lack of openness may lead to lost trust and suspicion, making it 
difficult to be heard by the public. 
 Compassionate understanding: To meet and take up public misconceptions and unrest 
is important in formulating effective messages. Communication should tell people 
what to do so they may protect themselves thereby increasing public self efficacy and 
dampen unrest. Lack of public understanding may lead to information needs being 
ignored and the public may search elsewhere for information. 
As can be seen in the principal outlining of communicating risk during a pandemic HOD 
(2006) promote a two way process of risk communication enhancing transparency in the 
decision making process and the inclusion of public concerns and information need in the 
overall design of the message content.  
 The HOD (2006) description of more concrete measures is structured according to 
overall goals and measures which should be based upon the WHO pandemic phases, if the 
virus has arrived in the country or not, and with consideration of the targets of the 
communication (DSB, 2010; HOD, 2006). For example, HOD (2006) states that the WHO 
pandemic phase 6 entails an overall goal of minimizing the effect of the pandemic. Risk 
communications targeting the public, if the virus is in the country, should among others 
measures show understanding for public reactions and evaluate an increase in communication 
measures depended upon the degree of seriousness of the pandemic. As can be seen, the more 
concrete risk communication and risk management measures defined by HOD (2006) are 
generic and meant to be adapted to the specific situation. Use of different communication 
channels (e.g. webpages, pandemic phone, etc.) are also described to be used according to 
goal, target group, description of the measure and message content, principles guiding it and 
who has the responsibility. Again these suggested measures are generic and the specific 
situation will define their use. 
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3.3.8 Information distribution during the pandemic 
During the A (H1N1) pandemic, the information distributed to the public was 
primarily the same as in the situational reports from FHI, but more brief and narrowly 
formulated (DSB, 2010), the reason being that the information could then be used by, for 
example, the Minister when communicating to the media. More specific numbers related to, 
for example, contagiousness was not communicated as such; however, the numbers could be 
accessed among others at the FHI report homepage. The information was further disseminated 
down to “county men, health organizations, patient-, user-, and professional-organizations, 
pharmacies and the largest municipalities” (DSB, 2010, p. 124). According to HOD (2006), 
the local health authorities are responsible for communication in their local community and 
good communication entails that information from other authorities is distributed downwards 
(and up if needed) so the information content is the same, but the presentation tailored to the 
specific situation in that community. The content of the information given to the public 
developed as more information was available to the health authorities and it was readily 
distributed within the relevant authorities and out to the public. According to the FHI status 
reports (2009) more specific information related to the risk assessment was also distributed as 
it became available, though mostly through the web pages where specific information could 
be accessed. For example, the report of the 8
th
 of May states that they will distribute daily risk 
assessments on www.FHI.no from that date on. The report at the 18
th
 of October added 
information on the vaccine on the same page (Aavitsland, 2009d; Iversen et al., 2009). The 
FHI reports were also distributed on the homepage address when they were available. 
 
3.3.9 Risk communication during the three pandemic phases 
 As to be shown by the brief outlining of the communication strategy and information 
distribution, communication during a pandemic is complex, involving many different 
measures according to the current situation and goals. According to DSB (2010) the 
Norwegian health authorities’ risk communication efforts can be divided into three main 
phases contingent upon what the overall goal was in that period. There were one hygienic 
advice phase, and two vaccine phases. It is important to note that throughout the phases the 
authorities provided regular situational updates about the national and international 
development of the pandemic and the vaccine (e.g. how many infected, if the biggest wave 
was believed over, number of infected and deaths etc.). 
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The hygienic advice phase covers the beginning of the pandemic up to before the 
vaccine was made available to the risk groups at the 12
th
 of October; this involves the FHI 
reports from 24
th
 of April to 15
th
 October. The main goal of communication in this period was 
to limit the spread of the virus (DSB, 2010) and, after the introduction of the virus in Norway 
(around the 11 of June), to limit serious illness and death (Aavitsland, 2009f). The general 
message throughout this period was that a pandemic is impending and the policy is to limit its 
spread but not at any cost. As detailed in the sampled FHI reports from this period, there was 
a continuous focus upon giving the public regular status updates about the pandemic 
nationally and internationally as it developed as to prepare the public for an impending 
pandemic. There was also continuous emphasis upon the pandemic as seemingly mild, but for 
some individuals, especially those with underlying disease, the virus could cause 
complications. Lack of information regarding different aspects of the risk assessment is 
reported as being admitted by the health authorities (among others the FHI reports were 
distributed on the net where they could be accessed). Around mid September until the 15
th
 
October information about a vaccine becoming available in mid-late October was distributed 
emphasising that risk groups, and heath personnel, would be prioritized and that 
recommendation to the public would follow (Aavitsland, 2009h; Iversen et al., 2009). 
There were some specific situations in this period which may have had an adverse 
effect on the risk communication effort. According to DSB (2010) the first press conference 
was specifically noteworthy. The 27
th
 of April a press conference was held by the health 
authorities, represented by the current HOD minister and representatives from the Health 
directorate and FHI. It presented HOD’s (2006) worst case scenario estimation of 13 000 
extra deaths and 1.2 million sick in half a year from the pandemic (DSB, 2010). It was, 
however, highlighted as the least likely scenario. The Health Directorate stated later that much 
was unknown at that point in time and that they were confident that the public would 
rationalise and have trust in the authorities (DSB, 2010). It is not the role of this thesis to 
judge if the presentation was right or wrong. What is important is that the FHI was not 
informed about the heavy emphasis on the worst case scenario, showing a lack of 
coordinating of the communication efforts at this early stage. According to DSB (2010) press 
conferences after this event were better coordinated and the message contents the same across 
channels. According to DSB (2010) the effects of this message led to a media focus on the 
worst case scenario and an overall public perception that the authorities initially exaggerated 
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the risk from the virus. Measurements of public risk perception will be given in the next 
section, where the effects of the hygienic campaign can be seen more clearly.  
The first vaccination campaign phase involves the vaccine called pandemrix. It begins 
with a focus on risk groups at the start of October 2009 and continues to the end of the same 
month. The main goal here was to reach as many individuals as possible in the risk groups, 
and health personnel, to get vaccinated (DSB, 2010). The goal was to limit the possibility of 
severe complications or deaths in the risk groups, not to limit the spread of the pandemic. 
More specifically the order was: (1) pregnant in second or third trimester, (2) individuals with 
risk of serious complications in the age 3-64 years and (3) individuals with serious risk of 
serious complications in the age 65 and above (Hungnes et al., 2011). Communication in this 
period emphasised distributing information to those who were in the risk groups, informing 
them that they were prioritized and recommended to take the vaccine. Pregnant women, as a 
risk group, received special advice and information about the vaccine itself (prerequisites for 
taking it) as well as general advice related to their condition (Iversen & Hauge, 2009). 
Information about the vaccine itself and possible side effects was also distributed. Besides the 
regular information and updates to the general public about national and international 
development, they were also informed that they would get the vaccine and that there were two 
doses for each person (it was found out later that one dose was needed but normally two 
vaccines are recommended for full effect, DSB, 2010). Lastly, since vaccination in Norway is 
done on the communal level, templates and texts were developed by the national health 
authorities for the municipalities so that information could be adapted and coordinated at that 
level. 
The second vaccination campaign phase starts with recommendation of mass 
vaccination the 23
rd
 of October. The campaign itself starts at the beginning of October after 
the risk groups had been vaccinated (DSB, 2010). Vaccination was, at this stage, available to 
the whole population. The main goal here was to get as many as possible in the public to 
know about the vaccine, where to get it, that there was enough for everybody and that it was 
the health authority’s recommendation to take it (DSB, 2010). Among the authorities’ 
recommendations for taking the vaccine was that everybody should take the vaccine to protect 
themselves from the pandemic, to protect others from it, and to lessen the infection pressure in 
society as a whole (Blystad et al., 2009). However, if there were people identified as 
belonging to the risk groups those were still prioritized. According to the FHI questions and 
answer page during the pandemic vaccination campaign, the vaccine would help against 
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complications for one-self and prevent transmission of the virus to others close by 
(Norwegian Institute of Public Health, 2010). A report on the usefulness of the vaccine in 
2011 from FHI, state that one of the goals of vaccination, besides protecting the individual 
from complications or death, was that people who were vaccinated would “protect others who 
either cannot be vaccinated or who have poor effect of the vaccine
11
 in that they do not expose 
them to infection” (Hungnes et al., 2011, p. 2). The health authorities sought to attain herd 
immunity: getting enough people immune to the virus so those who were not immune 
(because they could or would not take the vaccine) still would be protected since those 
immune cannot transmit the virus (c.f. May, 2005). It is important to note that the primary 
goal of the second phase was not to affect the course of the pandemic, meaning to limit or 
stop the spread. If this had been the goal then it would have been a greater focus upon 
vaccinating the potential big spreaders, such as school children (Hungnes et al., 2011).  
Of special interest in this period is the first occurrences of possible side effects and 
deaths from the vaccine. FHI had in this period published information about the vaccine and 
its safety as proven by European drug authorities (EMEA) (Blystad et al., 2009). Another 
webpage was also made accessible and run by the Norwegian Medicines Agency the 19
th
 of 
March 2010, wherein it was possible to see registered side effects and deaths related to the 
vaccine, and a short report if there was a causal link between the vaccine and illness/death. 
The page is still running and it is being updated
12
. As per February 2010 ten reports of deaths 
had been reported with no causal link to the vaccine (Norwegian Medical Agency, 2010). 
Iversen & Blystad (2009) also report that there was a growing assumption that a number of 
countries had not recommended the vaccine to pregnant women with adjuvant. This 
assumption was refuted by FHI, after reviewing the official recommendations from other 
countries and organizations (e.g. WHO), and a summary of other countries recommendations 
to pregnant women was provided. In total FHI estimated that 2.2 million individuals, or 45%, 
of the Norwegian population, were vaccinated against the pandemic virus (Hungnes et al., 
2011). Estimates of how many in the risk groups that were vaccinated are not given though 
the report states that early vaccination of risk groups likely prevented many deaths. According 
to the DSB report (2010) young adults were less likely to get vaccinated than the rest of the 
population and men less so than women. According to the FHI report by Iversen (2009) 
                                                 
11
 In Norwegian “…dårlig effekt av vaksinen…” 
12
 See the Norwegian Medicines Agency (2012) in the reference list to access the web page. Note that the web 
page is in Norwegian and is continually updated; the reference date may therefore be inconsistent with the latest 
update. 
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young people (children and adolescents) should get the vaccine since they are more prone to 
infection and are those that most effectively spread the virus.  
  
3.3.10 Communication channels  
During the pandemic a wide variety of communication channels were used to inform 
the public through the three phases such as posters, web pages, household information, TV, 
movies and public “pandemic phones” (DSB, 2010). Active use of such channels is detailed 
by HOD (2006). The thesis will give a short summary of the performance of the most central 
channels for informing the public during the pandemic. The selection was mainly determined 
by the frequency of which they were used by the authorities and the public, as presented by 
DSB (2010).  
Media: HOD (2006) defines media as radio, TV, newspapers, journals and online 
media. FHI was normally contacted by the media five to ten times a day and up to twenty 
times on a busy day. During the main wave this type of contact could reach 60 to 80 inquiries 
a day. FHI was the most heavily contacted health authority during the period (DSB, 2010). 
Most questions were of a professional character and related to the current situation. Press 
briefings, a total of 13, were arranged by FHI and the Health directorate to address issues to 
relieve the pressure from the media.  
However, the amount of contact by the media is shown to be largely contingent upon 
the development of the pandemic situation. Since the FHI reports (2009) use words such as 
few, many, less than last report, or numbers such, as 5 – 10, to describe media contact, a 
comprehensive figure cannot be produced. What is shown in the selected FHI reports (2009) 
however, is that media contact increases and fluctuates in accordance with the general 
pandemic development or specific events (e.g. vaccine related and deaths). For example, there 
were 20 media contacts related to a suspected case of infection in Trondheim in early May 
(Aavitsland, 2009i). After the introduction of the first cases of infected in the country (around 
11 June) the media focused on these cases but the amount of contacts were few (Aavitsland, 
2009b). In contrast, as the pandemic developed with more people being infected and some 
seriously ill, the media contact increased to an average of around 30 – 40 media contacts each 
week day and to 10 – 15 in the weekends in July requesting mostly information about the 
authorities’ preparedness and prevention measures against the pandemic (Aavitsland, 2009f). 
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In September less than five contacts each day were reported, which was considerable lower 
than in July. The media asked mostly for basic information related to the vaccine in this 
period (Aavitsland, 2009h). Then again, a high amount of media contact became prominent in 
late October and November (up to 20 contacts each day, though not as high as reported in 
July). The main information requested related to the vaccine such as when vaccination starts, 
distribution, what it consists of, possible side effects etc. (Iversen et al., 2009; Iversen & 
Hauge, 2009; Blystad et al., 2009; Iversen, 2009) 
The Pandemic phone: The contact channels were established the 3
rd
 of August and run 
by the Health Directorate (Aavitsland, 2009f). The main messages conveyed here reproduced 
the information from pandemi.no or gave simple advice. People with more medically specific 
questions were referred to medical doctors or other professionals. According to DSB (2010) 
the use of the phone channel exploded in October. Though no specific number is given one of 
the phone personnel reports that the use “went from 20 to 900 enquiries on one day!” (DSB, 
2010, p. 127) highlighting the increase of its use in this period.   
The Web pages FHI.no and pandemi.no: On the internet the webpage FHI.no was 
established the 24
th
 of April 2009 and was continually updated with information on the 
current situation, advice to travellers and those who lived in the infected areas, advice to the 
health services and a questions and answers page (DSB, 2010). More general information 
relating to health information aimed at the public was supplied at the webpage pandemi.no, 
established the 4
th
 of may, and which received over 90 000 visitors during the first three days. 
This webpage contained links to other web pages (e.g., FHI.no, Regjeringen.no) where more 
concrete information could be accessed if desired (DSB, 2010). The webpages were run by 
both FHI and the Health Directorate even though the Health Directorate had the main 
responsibility.  
Posters: Of particular noteworthiness is the early introduction of posters, at the 29
th
 of 
April, 2009, displaying basic hygienic advice aimed at limiting the spread of the pandemic 
(Aavitsland, 2009c). These were distributed firstly to airports with international flights. In 
around the end of July/beginning of August another 80 000 posters were distributed to 
kindergartens, schools, high schools and universities in the country (Aavitsland, 2009g). The 
poster was simply made and highlighted the importance of washing the hands, 
sneezing/coughing in the crook of the arm and stay at home if sick (see Appendix D). This 
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information was also repeated through other channels such as TV, movies, public “pandemic 
phones”, web pages etc. (DSB, 2010).  
  
3.4 Public risk perception, behaviour change and risk communication results 
Eight public surveys were performed within Norway during the 2009 pandemic by the market 
research firms Synovate, Opinion, Sentio and Respons. These surveys were collected by 
Synovate (2009) and analyzed by Synovate (2010) on assignment from the Health 
Directorate. The surveys performed by Synovate and Opinion (four in total) were financed by 
the Health Directorate. The other four surveys by Sentio and Respons was financed by 
external actors (the newspapers Aftenposten and Bergens Tidende) according to DSB (2010). 
The measurements were mainly based upon rating of statements on category scales and 
responses to open ended questions, collected through phone interviews of 500 – 1000 
individuals in nationally drawn quota samples. Since the surveys were performed by different 
actors and finance by different sources, in different points in time, with different samples, and 
with different questions and methods the various measurements are not readily comparable. 
However, the data presented here are the data currently available regarding the A (H1N1) 
pandemic in Norway and are those used in this thesis. The compilations give some clues on 
how the public perceived the pandemic, authorities and information during the pandemic as 
well as some indication of possible behavioural change. In addition, a European survey was 
performed by Eurobarometer (2009) between 26 – 30 November 2009 consisting of 28000 
respondents across 27 EU member states. The study is mentioned as being evaluated by the 
Norwegian health authorities during the pandemic (DSB, 2010). Lastly an overview of media 
coverage of the pandemic was performed by Retriever on assignment from the Health 
Directorate (DSB, 2010).  
 Presented below are the results, and further discussion of the results’ relevance will be 
covered in the discussion chapter. The thesis will firstly present the findings of the general 
public’s risk perception. It will then give results on public behavioural change in relation to 
the hygienic and vaccination phases related to risk communication. Lastly, detailed results 
relevant for each of the risk perception factors will be presented. No measures were 
specifically related to personal experience and perceived antagonism. Implications of these 
factors and their relevance will be discussed in the discussion chapter. The criteria for 
inclusion of survey results are detailed in each section. 
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 Public risk perception during the pandemic: The results deemed valid for assessing 
general public risk perception are ratings of public concern of infection by Synovate and 
Opinion (Synovate, 2009) and Eurobarometer (2009). Public concern is seen to be valid since 
it reflects overall subjective evaluations of risk from the pandemic. The collected polls from 
Synovate (2009) measured public concern by asking respondents to give their rating on the 
provided scales of the statements: “I am not concerned of getting infected or sick due to the 
pandemic flu” (presented in figure 2). According to figure 2 the largest difference in public 
concern occurred between August to October. Synovate’s (2010) analysis attributes this trend 
to the occurrence of the main pandemic wave hitting the country in October. The 
measurements by Eurobarometer (2009) in November on public concern asked different 
questions than Synovate (2009). Specifically they asked how concerned the respondents were: 
(i) about the possibility of the A (H1N1) virus becoming a serious risk in their country, (ii) of 
how likely they believed it was that they would personally catch the pandemic influenza, and 
(iii) how dangerous the pandemic was in comparison with the seasonal influenza. They found 
that the Norwegian respondents were largely unconcerned about the pandemic developing 
into a serious risk (72% not concerned at all/not concerned versus 27% quite concerned/very 
much concerned). Norwegians were almost equally divided between those who deemed it 
likely to get infected versus those who did not. In addition a small majority of Norwegians 
deemed the pandemic as more dangerous (54%). Whereas those who did not (43%). To 
summarize, public concern during the 2009 pandemic situation stayed relatively stable with 
the exception of October. The Norwegian public was neither very concerned about the 
pandemic itself or that it could develop into a serious risk.  
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Figure 2 Percentages of public concern for four months of 2009. Data presented by Synovate (2009) from the 
Synovate source in April and August, and Opinion source in October and December. Figure adapted from 
Synovate (2009). Respondents were asked to rate their agreement to the statement: I am not concerned of getting 
infected or sick from the swine flu. 
 Behavioural change: Included here are results on reported public behavioural change. 
The presentation of possible behavioural change is limited mainly to knowledge about 
hygienic measures and the vaccine since these were the main issues of communication during 
the pandemic and were reported by Synovate (2009). Measurements by Eurobarometer (2009) 
give some more behavioural change results and they are presented last. Since there are two 
different studies (in terms of time of survey and questions asked) by Synovate (2009), each 
conducted by different contractors, the results are not placed into a single figure (see Figure 3 
and Figure 4). 
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Figure 3 Frequency responses to open ended questions regarding measures the individual did take against 
infection in the months of August and November. Data presented by Synovate (2009) from the Sentio source. 
Figure adapted from Synovate (2009). Respondents were asked the question: Are you doing anything actively to 
prevent infection? If so  what? 
 
Figure 4 Frequency responses to open ended questions regarding measures the individual implemented to 
protect oneself or loved ones against infection in the months of October and December. Data presented by 
Synovate (2009) from the Opinion source. Figure adapted from Synovate (2009). Respondents were asked the 
question: have you implemented any measures to protect you or your loved ones from being infected, and if so, 
which ones?  
Both surveys ask open questions and the most frequent answers are given in 
percentages. Figure 3 focuses on behaviour change the respondents have performed 
themselves in relation to the pandemic while figure 4 focuses upon single acts of preventive 
measures towards infection by the virus in relation to the respondents as well as others close 
to them. Specifically, the respondents represented in Figure 4 were asked to mention three 
concrete measures against infection (Synovate, 2009). The respondents in Figure 3 were 
asked to mention any concrete measures and the respondents were allowed to give several 
answers not just one.  
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Figure 3 shows that there was a decline from 48% to 29% in the months of August and 
November of those answering “no” to the question if they had done anything to prevent 
infection. Among the measures taken to prevent infection washing and disinfectant of hands 
are those mostly used, showing a small increase from August to November. The sharpest 
increase is related to the respondents’ acquirement of medicinal equipment/vaccine going 
from 1% to 12% in this period. To sneeze against the shoulder
13
 is the same for both periods. 
It should be mentioned that the advice from the health authorities says sneezing in the crook 
of the arm, not against the shoulder. The end result is the same: avoiding sneezing into the 
palm of the hand to avoid transmitting disease by touch.  
Figure 4 shows a small decline in the use of general hygienic measures between the 
periods of October and December. In contrast use of the vaccine as a measure to prevent 
infection goes from 4% to 32% in the period. Synovate (2010) attributes some of the decline 
in hygienic measures to be possibly related to the increase of vaccinations as a measure to 
prevent infection towards oneself and others.  
Measurements by Eurobarometer (2009) in November found that 38% of the 
Norwegians stated that they had changed their behaviour to protect themselves against the 
pandemic. When asked to mention how they changed their behaviour (of those who so 
indicated), mostly mentioned washing their hands regularly (78%), whereas fewer mentioned 
good respiratory hygiene (e.g. sneezing in tissue) (16%), avoiding places with large number 
of people (11%), avoiding people who are infected (10%), or got vaccinated (5%).  
Regarding change of behaviour there was considerable deviation in Eurobarometer 
(2009) results as compared to the Synovate (2009) measurements in November. Synovate 
(2009) reports 29% while Eurobarometer (2009) reports 61%. The difference in reported 
behavioural change between the two may be attributed to Synovate (2009) asking if the 
respondents did something actively to prevent infection while Eurobarometer (2009) simply 
asked about behaviour change which in the latter case may imply a stronger sense of general 
behaviour change, as compared to the Synovate study (2009). In either case both 
measurements ask the same thing, namely change in behavioural measures used to protect 
oneself from infection. 
 Social trust: In this context the inclusion of results had to fulfil the criteria of 
measuring trust in the health authorities during the pandemic. Eurobarometer (2009) asked 
                                                 
13
 This expression is here considered equal to “cough in the crook of the arm”. 
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their respondents to rate how they trusted different information sources, including, among 
others, the health authorities, to provide them with information about the pandemic. Synovate 
(2009) had two relevant measurements. The first asked the respondents to rate the statement: 
“I am confident the Norwegian health authorities are well prepared now that the swine flu has 
come to Norway”. The second task asked the respondents to rate to what degree they were 
satisfied with the information from the health authorities through the statement: “Norwegian 
health authorities have given good and balanced information about the swine flu”. Both 
reflect social trust since they concerned public willingness to rely on others for judgment 
about the risk.  
 Figure 5 shows the results from the Eurobarometer (2009) survey in November, NHA 
stands for the Norwegian national health authority. Figure 6 illustrates the first statement by 
Synovate (2009) presented above, and Figure 7 illustrates the second one. 
 
Figure 5 Percentages of trust in information source in November 2009, Norwegian population of the 
Eurobarometer. Adapted from Eurobarometer (2009) 
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Figure 6 Percentages of trust in health authorities. Data presented by Synovate (2009) from the Synovate source 
in April and August, and Opinion source in October and December. Figure adapted from Synovate (2009). 
Illustrated are the respondents who agreed to the statement: I am confident the Norwegian health authorities are 
well prepared now that the swine flu has come to Norway 
 
 
Figure 7 Public satisfaction with information from the health authorities. Data presented by Synovate (2009) 
from the Synovate source in April and August, and Opinion source in October and December. Figure adapted 
from Synovate (2009). Respondents were asked to rate their agreement to the statement: Norwegian health 
authorities have given good and balanced information about the swine flu.  
The Eurobarometer data figures show that the Norwegian health authority was 
considerably trusted as an information source along with professionals (e.g. doctors and 
pharmacists) compared to other sources such as media (e.g. TV, radio, newspapers etc.) and 
the internet which were largely distrusted. It should be noted, however, that in most countries 
trust in national health authorities came second after trust in health professionals which were 
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considerable more trusted on average. The Norwegian findings of equal trust in both are 
limited to Norway only (Eurobarometer, 2009). Figure 6 based on Synovate (2009) includes 
only those who partly agreed/agreed fully to the statement. However, one can see that trust 
scores were considerably high throughout the pandemic with a slow decrease in trust as the 
main wave hit the country and the vaccine became available. It is important to note that the 
Eurobarometer (2009) study rated trust in information sources while Synovate (2009) rated 
public perception of the authority’s capability to handle the pandemic. Nonetheless, the 
Norwegian authority enjoyed considerable trust in both respects. Lastly, Figure 7 shows that 
the Norwegian populace was largely satisfied with the information from the authorities. 
However, there was a doubling of respondent discontent regarding the information received 
from the authority between April and August, which is an increase from 11% to 25%. The 
majority was content however, and 74% in April to 69% in August were content, although 
this trend also shows that there was a steady, albeit small, decline in satisfaction. 
 Epistemic trust: Results relevant to epistemic trust in this thesis had to reflect public 
trust in scientific knowledge. Synovate (2009) had one relevant measurement where the 
polling firm asked the respondents to rate the statement: “the Norwegian authorities have 
exaggerated the danger from the swine flu”. This statement is taken to reflect epistemic trust 
since it reflects a subjective estimation of authority estimations of the risk compared to their 
own. In this respect the statement to a lesser degree reflects social trust. Other relevant 
measurements by Synovate (2009) and Eurobarometer (2009) captured perceptions of the 
vaccine which is a kind of technological risk estimation and can therefore be assumed to be 
more related to epistemic trust (c.f. Sjöberg, 2008).  
 Synovate (2009) found that the majority of respondents felt that the authorities 
exaggerated the danger the pandemic posed (illustrated in figure 8). 
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Figure 8 Public perceptions regarding that the health authorities have exaggerated the danger from the A 
(H1N1) influenza. Data presented by Synovate (2009) from the Synovate source in April and August, and 
Opinion source in October and December. Figure adapted from Synovate (2009). Respondents were asked to rate 
the statement: Norwegian authorities have exaggerated the danger from the swine flu.   
Synovate (2010) partly attributed some of the negative trend seen in trust and 
satisfaction with information to the effect seen in this variable. The proportion of respondent’s 
agreeing to the assumption that the authorities exaggerated the pandemic went from 33% in 
April to 66% in August. In October this trend backed somewhat (54%) but increased again in 
December (61%). The development in October could likely be attributed to the main wave 
hitting the country creating an increase in public concern which would indicate that the 
pandemic was considered real (Synovate, 2010). 
 The analysis by Synovate (2009) considered public willingness to take the vaccine in 
week 42, 43, 49 and 50 in 2009 (from middle of October to the middle of December). 
Measurements in week 42 and 50 were financed by the newspaper firm Aftenposten. Lastly, 
week 43 and 49 was financed by the Health Directorate.. The results are shown in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9 Changes in public attitude towards the vaccine. Data presented by Synovate (2009) from the Respons 
source in week 42 and 50, and Opinion source in week 43 and 49. Figure adapted from Synovate 2009. 
Respondents were asked different questions. Week 42 and 50: Do you think you are going to take advantage of 
the offer of flu vaccine? Week 43 and 49: Do you wish to take the vaccine against the swine flu?  
This compilation of available information shows that there was a great increase from 
23% wishing to take the vaccine in week 42 to 51% in week 43. A small increase was seen in 
week 49 to 56%, the same in week 50 with only a minor increase to 56%. The increase in 
willingness to take the vaccine between week 42 and 43 may be attributed to the vaccination 
campaign, increase in infection rate or increased media coverage (Synovate, 2010). However, 
Synovate (2010) also state that the results may be due to differences in the questions asked by 
the different actors. Results from these surveys are therefore directional at best. Results from 
Eurobarometer (2009) in November largely support the results from Synovate (2009). Most 
Norwegians in November thought it “very likely” or “likely” that they would get vaccinated if 
the vaccine became available to them (56%) versus those who though such action was “very 
unlikely” or “unlikely” (32.1%).  
 Media coverage: Some data on media coverage during the pandemic is presented 
Figure 10. The figure is adapted from the DSB report (2010). The data were collected by 
Retriever on assignment from the Norwegian Health Directorate. The DSB report (2010) uses 
the pandemic plans (HOD, 2006) definition of media as radio, TV, newspapers, journals and 
online media.  
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Figure 10 Data presented by DSB (2010) from the Retriever source on media coverage during the A (H1N1) 
pandemic from April 2009 to January 2010.  Figure adapted from DSB (2010).  
 The figure shows that there was considerable media coverage in each month of the 
pandemic. In fact, the A (H1N1) was Norway’s biggest media case in 2009 (DSB, 2010). The 
lowest coverage was in June, September, and December in 2009 and January 2010. Still, in 
these periods there were around 100 to 200 articles published. The highest points were in 
October and November 2009 which coincide with the biggest infection wave hitting the 
country. The number of articles published these months was between approximately 850 to 
900.  
 Media focus also changed from month to month depending upon what the main events 
were during the time. The main focus of the media from month to month, from April 2009 to 
January 2010, is illustrated in Table 6.  
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Table 6 Media focus in Norway from April 2009 to January 2010 
Month 2009/2010 Media focus 
April First Outbreak abroad and presentation of 
“worst case” scenario by the health 
authorities’ 
May First detected infection in Norway and the 
continual global spread 
June First case of infection in Norway 
July Continued spread in Norway and 
preparations and preventive measures against 
the pandemic in Norway 
August Information about preventive measures 
September First registered fatality in Norway 
October Increased spread of the virus and vaccination 
November Spread and fatalities in Norway along with 
prescription free Tamiflu and discussions 
about the side effects of the vaccine 
December Decrease in number infected 
January General discussion about the side effects of 
the pandemic and the government’s handling 
of the pandemic 
Note. Table based upon data presented by DSB (2010) from the Retriever source on media coverage during the 
A (H1N1) pandemic from April 2009 to January 2010.   
 As shown in table 6 media foci were on some “danger” aspects of the pandemic, such 
as the presentation of the “worst case” scenario in April 2009 and fatalities in September 
2009. Some other negative aspects of the media coverage were also reported in the months 
when the media focus were not reported to focus on the “danger” aspect of the pandemic, but 
rather on dramatic storytelling through exaggeration of the risk. For example, DSB (2010) 
state that an employee in the Stord municipality, central in handling the pandemic within 
his/her municipality, reported that when the vaccine started the 22 of October they weren’t 
prepared for such a massive amount of people showing up wanting vaccination and the 
situation were described as chaotic. The Stord municipality employee attributed the situation 
to the media having exaggerated the situation and that the health authorities had not done 
enough to calm it. The example is not attributable to all municipalities in Norway, but it 
shows some of the challenges which arose due to media coverage. 
For the most part however, especially in the months when media coverage was most 
extensive (see figure 10), the media focused upon conveying messages from the health 
authorities. DSB (2010) state that overall the media focus was mostly upon prevention and 
treatment of the influenza with a running update of disease and infection. “Seen in a public 
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health perspective most people received good access to advice about prevention and treatment 
trough the media” (DSB, 2010, p. 128). The health authorities tended to dominate the overall 
media picture during the pandemic and media coverage are said have reinforced the messages 
from the health authorities (DSB, 2010). In reference to what has been reviewed earlier in this 
thesis regarding the media, negative media focus, such as upon the presentation of the “worst 
case” scenario in April 2009, could have had negative effects upon public perception of risk. 
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4.0 Discussion 
The thesis has so far pointed out that risk perception is an important determinant in future 
behavior. Specifically this work has focused upon the role of three main factors; personal 
experience, trust and media with respect to people’s reactions to risk, knowledge and 
concerns. Both individual cognitive processing and more general framework factors have 
been described with the overall aim to provide a better knowledge basis for considerations 
related to the next pandemic situation. This discussion will mainly be related to the usefulness 
of this approach with respect to the next pandemic, specifically for Norway. As always, the 
overall aim is to enhance risk communication efficiency, and thereby risk management. 
This chapter will start by establishing factors that can be generalized for the pandemic 
risk. It will then define a general framework of a future pandemic in Norway.  The framework 
consists of three selected situational phases, a pre-pandemic, main pandemic, and post-
pandemic phase. The pandemic framework will provide the basis for a general discussion of 
risk perception and risk communication on a national basis in Norway.  The thesis will then 
present four selected situational alternatives, based upon predictions of likelihood and 
severity, which may occur during a pandemic requiring more specific risk communication. 
Considerations of risk perception and the use of the different tools of communication; the 
ELM model, mental modeling, and the RISCOM model of transparency, will be presented 
and elaborated upon both in the general framework and within the selected possible phases 
which may occur. A conclusion will be based upon the discussion. 
 
4.1 General factors of the pandemic risk 
There are several factors which are generally given for the entire pandemic risk which will be 
detailed before describing the pandemic framework for a future pandemic in Norway. 
Firstly, the division of responsibility among the health authorities has already been 
outlined in HOD (2006), National Health Care Plan in 2007 and the Disease Control Act 1994 
(see DSB, 2010). The organization of risk management, risk assessment and risk 
communication will therefore be largely the same as in the latest pandemic (DSB, 2010). 
Secondly, the pandemic risk will receive a lot of attention from the already existing 
general media which are controlled by external actors (e.g. TV, radio, internet, etc.), as seen 
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during the latest pandemic by the analysis by the consult firm Retriever (see DSB, 2010). As 
such, these channels of communication already exist and will be used by the health authorities 
throughout the pandemic to provide regular situational updates about the pandemic risk (i.e. 
dissemination of their risk assessment so far) as detailed by the Pandemic plan (HOD, 2006). 
Other channels will have to be developed and run by the health authorities and will be further 
discussed within the pandemic framework. 
Thirdly, it will take time to produce concrete scientific information and measures. This 
was seen during the latest pandemic with scientific information coming “piece meal” over 
time (see Tables 2 – 4). As such it will take time to, for example, produce concrete messages 
to the public or to produce a vaccine. Communication of risk, when scientific information is 
lacking, will have to rely on what is “common sense” based on prior knowledge and 
experience. 
Fourth, since pandemics generally occur within a 10-40 year interval (HOD, 2006) it 
is reasonable to assume that the majority of the public will have prior experience with a 
pandemic. As such it is important to take note of the public’s prior experience with a 
pandemic since it will affect their reaction to the next one. Further, public risk perception of 
the pandemic risk will develop over time contingent upon situational factors of risk perception 
such as media coverage, increase in number of fatalities and so on. Risk communicators will 
therefore have to take into account the risk perception development when formulating their 
messages. 
Lastly, the amount of attention the pandemic risk will receive from the general media, 
and likely also from other external sources of information (e.g. other experts and 
organizations), may at best simply disagree with the health authorities and at the worst 
launch/show open opposition which may create controversy. The media attention can be a 
blessing for the health authorities wishing to convey their messages to the public. It may also 
be a curse if the media presents opinions from external actors in opposition to the health 
authorities’ information and advice, or if they, for example, have a disproportional focus on 
rare health risks as opposed to the more common public health effect of the pandemic (c.f. 
Ackerson & Viswanath, 2010) or just focus upon dramatic storytelling (c.f. May, 2005). As 
such the media and external sources of information may exaggerate or possibly downplay the 
pandemic risk. Due to the relatively unforeseeable and unreliable nature of the media and 
external sources of information it is important that risk communication efforts aim at 
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providing the public with “tools” which give them the ability to critically analyze information 
so they can decide for themselves what constitute correct information and risk mitigation 
measures for them. In other words, to provide them with “tools” which promote central route 
processing of information from different sources (Petty et al., 2005; Petty et al., 2009). 
 
4.2 Framework of a future pandemic in Norway 
The pandemic framework detailed here is based upon four assumptions about a future 
pandemic. Firstly, a potential pandemic risk is identified when WHO declares pandemic 
phase three signaling a possible human to human transmittable virus, for example, as seen 
during the latest pandemic (DSB, 2010). Secondly, the thesis assumes that the pandemic virus 
will be identified outside the borders of Norway. Should a pandemic virus be identified within 
the borders of Norway this would require another approach than that being discussed in this 
thesis. Lastly, the thesis assumes that the Norwegian health authorities will have no 
knowledge of (i) the speed of which the virus spreads and (ii) its potential severity. The 
reason being that the speed of the spread and severity of prior pandemics have varied and do 
not provide a secure basis for estimating the development and effects of a future pandemic 
(see Table 1). The effects of a future pandemic cannot be effectively measured before it is 
actually observable, and even then it will take time for the risk assessors to provide confident 
risk estimates as seen during the latest pandemic (see Tables 2 – 4). Thus, valid information 
about the severity of the virus will most probably require time. A future pandemic may spread 
slowly, or it may spread fast; it may be severe or it may not. What characterizes the different 
phases presented here is therefore the geographical spread of the virus as defined by WHO 
pandemic phases (see Appendix C). 
Based upon these assumptions and the WHO pandemic phases the thesis specify three 
selected possible pandemic phases which outline the framework of a future pandemic: a pre-
pandemic phase, a main pandemic phase, and a post-pandemic phase. 
The pre-pandemic phase is characterized by the detection of a possible pandemic virus 
outside the borders of Norway and it lasts until the virus is introduced into the country. In 
terms of the WHO pandemic phases the pre-pandemic phase starts when WHO declares 
pandemic phase three (WHO, 2009b). This phase may last until WHO declares pandemic 
phase six. The general goal of the health authorities during this phase is to delay the 
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introduction of the pandemic virus into Norway and to prepare itself and the public for an 
impending pandemic. 
The main pandemic phase is characterized by an identified pandemic virus being 
introduced into Norway and lasts until the pandemic has run its course, meaning that the main 
wave of infected is in decline signaling the beginning of the end of the pandemic. The earliest 
possible WHO level during this phase is level five since it signals transmission from one 
nation to another, thus, signaling an impending pandemic (WHO, 2009b). The WHO 
announcement that the pandemic situation has reached the post-pandemic period marks the 
end of this main phase. The general goal of risk communication during this phase is to limit 
the spread and effects of the pandemic to enhance and ensure public health and lives. 
The post-pandemic phase starts when the number of infections, sicknesses and deaths 
related to the pandemic is mainly over. In terms of the WHO phases, this phase starts when 
WHO declares that the pandemic has reached the post-pandemic period. There may still be 
occurrences related to the pandemic virus, but such events are isolated events and not a 
representation of the overall situation in Norway. Furthermore, a large portion of the 
population is immune to the virus, or less exposed due to herd immunity, and the pandemic 
and its associated risks for the overall society are for all intents and purposes over. Risk 
communication during this phase is one of follow-up, including the consideration and 
evaluation of the prior pandemic. 
 
4.3 Risk communication during the pre-pandemic phase 
To achieve the general goal during the pre-pandemic phase, the authorities’ risk 
communication will follow the general outline detailed above of providing the public with 
regular situational updates about the pandemic risk, so they are aware and updated of the 
pandemic, and to promote measures against the spread of the pandemic risk. However, the 
pre-pandemic phase will be characterized by a general lack of specific scientific information, 
especially early on, with which to form concrete counter-measures (e.g. vaccine) and specific 
risk communication. By specific risk communication the thesis means communication aimed 
at the individual. For example, if scientific information shows that young people are at greater 
risk then specific risk communication will be the construction of messages aimed at 
individuals in this group. The lack of specific scientific knowledge means that the health 
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authorities will have to promote measures to the general public which are based on “common 
sense” in their ability to delay the introduction of the virus into Norway and to limit the effect 
of the virus once introduced. “Common sense” measures are measures which are generally 
known to be important against a virus and pandemic risk. Examples of such measures are the 
promotion of hygienic measures, travelling advice and so on. These measures cannot entirely 
solve the pandemic risk, but are effective at limiting the spread of the virus and may delay the 
introduction of the virus into Norway. 
However, the effectiveness of general situational updates and promotion of “common 
sense”, and later specific measures (e.g. vaccination), will be contingent upon several general 
requirements which must be established during the pre-pandemic phase, and considered and 
maintained throughout the pandemic, to evaluate the provision of effective risk 
communication. Firstly, the health authorities need to be trusted as a good and reliable source 
of information which can make judgments of the pandemic risk on the behalf of the public 
(c.f. Drottz-Sjöberg, 2003; Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). Secondly, the health authorities 
need to reach as many people as possible. Lastly, public risk perceptions will have to be 
considered when formulating messages of protective measures to the public. This is important 
when the health authorities as of yet do not know how serious the pandemic risk is, and 
especially if later scientific information shows it is serious. All requirements are closely 
related, but the two first requirements must be established first to even consider risk 
perception when constructing messages to the public. The main focus here will therefore be 
on these two first conditions. If the health authorities are not trusted or cannot communicate to 
the overall public then further attempts at risk communication will have very limited effects 
or be in vain. 
 
4.3.1 The importance of trust and self-established channels of communication 
To be trusted as a good source of information one has to, for example, provide the 
public with regular information through various channels which provide information at 
varying degrees of specificity. Some people will want much information, some will want 
little. Some will want information related to them (e.g. parents, teachers, etc.), some will be 
content with general information. The “regular” channels controlled by external actors (called 
general media from now on) are important channels since they may reach a lot of people. 
However, the general media provide a somewhat limited arena in which to convey messages. 
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Newspaper, newscasts, radio broadcasts, etc., will require short simple messages summarizing 
the main parts of the FHI risk assessments so far; along with short examples of protective 
measures (DSB, 2010). As such the channels do not provide a reliable basis in which to reach 
all the potential different groups wanting different information. Further, the general media 
may also be distrusted to various degrees as an information source by some or most of the 
public, as was the case in the latest pandemic (Eurobarometer, 2009), and the public may 
therefore be disinclined to listen. Or they may be mistakenly trusted, which may provide other 
challenges if, for example, the general media focuses upon dramatic storytelling (May, 2005) 
and thereby exaggerate the pandemic risk. Or conversely, they may downplay the severity of 
the pandemic risk and thus hinder precautionary measures. 
If the health authorities do not reach all the different population groups, or just present 
summarized information, then those groups may look elsewhere for information (e.g. external 
self-declared experts suggesting alternative solutions) and consequently come to distrust the 
health authorities. Such developments would in all likelihood, have a general negative effect 
upon public trust in the health authorities and at best portray them as an incompetent source of 
information not worth listening to (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000), or at worst, see them as 
non-caring and antagonistic, which would increase public risk perception (Sjöberg, 2008). 
This again may lead to external sources of information getting a foothold in defining the 
discourse of the pandemic. Such development may prove faulty at best (e.g. giving bad advice 
or creating controversies) and disastrous at worst should the pandemic be severe. Further, if 
the general media is allowed to control which information are deemed relevant, or how 
information should be presented, then public risk perception will likely be heavily influenced 
by them, as opposed to the health authorities. 
To hinder or mitigate the possible negative effects from the media, and to provide 
correct and sufficient information to the public, it is important for the health authorities to 
establish communication channels in which they themselves construct the message content. 
Most easily established during the pre-pandemic phase are web pages, which have been 
shown to be frequently used by the public (DSB, 2010). Such web pages can contain 
information aimed at different groups (e.g. summaries, information to pregnant women, etc.) 
which can be presented in a more sober manner relative to the general medias’ presentation as 
of how to mitigate possible effects. Examples of subsequent communication means are the 
introduction of pandemic phone lines and brochures distributed at hospitals, local health 
clinics and pharmacies and so on, which will require more scientific information to be viable 
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for good solutions. Finally, by providing much differentiated information through easily 
accessible channels the health authorities establish themselves as a trusted source of 
information. Trust is the result of action, for example, good and correct information, and that 
the suggested measures actually work. Information on such channels should also be presented 
in a clear and respectful manner as to prevent misunderstandings (Fischhoff, 1995). They 
should also, whenever possible, establish two-way communication, meaning that the public 
should, for example, be able to ask questions or to request more information (e.g. a question 
and answer page on the web page). Such multifaceted efforts would further facilitate public 
trust in the health authorities. Such two-way communications may also make the health 
authorities’ aware of public concerns of which they were not aware of, and these concerns 
may then be addressed as they arise. 
 
4.3.2 Risk perception’s role in promoting protective measures 
Considerations of public risk perception are important when communicating protective 
measures to the public since it is an important determinant of public behavior (Brewer et al., 
2007). The role of risk perception is therefore, in this thesis, specifically relevant when 
providing messages which are meant to promote protective behavior. If public risk perception 
should be low, with respect to the risk of a novel virus, then the impact of the warning 
messages are likely to be less effective, due to the view that the pandemic risk is not 
warranting protective measures. Conversely, should public risk perception be high then the 
suggested measures by the health authorities may be seen as lacking and insufficient, 
consequently reducing public trust in the authorities. However, public risk perception will 
vary contingent upon different variables in each pandemic phase.  
In general however, one can assume that risk perception will increase and decrease 
along with the amount of media coverage (Wåhlberg & Sjöberg, 2000) and how the stories 
are perpetrated (Ackerson & Viswanath, 2010; May, 2005). Considerations of the effects of 
the media coverage on risk perception will therefore have to be continually evaluated by the 
health authorities as the pandemic develops. The thesis assumes that the health authorities will 
balance the effects of the media, and will be largely trusted, by following the general risk 
communication strategy of providing situational updates and information through the 
communication channels they have established to inform different societal groups in the 
population; that is, provided they do not perpetrate themselves in an antagonistic manner (c.f. 
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Sjöberg, 2008). It is the promotion of protective behavior, through “common sense” or 
specific information, aimed at individuals which further strengthen this trust. 
Considerations of public risk perception when constructing messages are to be based 
at the specific group and individual level. The thesis has provided different theoretical tools 
with which to measure and analyze public risk perception: the psychometric model and the 
mental model approach. The psychometric model may be used to measure the level of 
different factors, consisting of many items, which make up the average risk perception of the 
pandemic risk in specified groups (Slovic et al., 1982; Sjöberg, 2000a). Usually based on 
questionnaires, it is faster and easier to execute than the mental model approach, which is why 
it would be most practical to use first to get an insight into public risk perceptions. Based 
upon such results one can determine which factor(s) should be considered when choosing and 
formulating messages to the public. 
For example, due to prior experience with a surprisingly mild pandemic with little 
experience of adverse effects one can assume that initial measurements in the pre-pandemic 
phase will show that the public does not dread the pandemic risk and feel they are 
knowledgeable about a pandemic risk (c.f. Weinstein, 1989). This may then explain why the 
public does not adhere to the promoted “common sense” measures during the pre-pandemic 
phase. Risk communication will therefore have to provide information that challenges this 
view since it is not fully warranted. This would require at least explaining that the 
characteristics of the latest pandemic cannot be attributed to this pandemic so one does not 
know how dangerous the pandemic may be at this stage; one should therefore prepare for the 
possibility of a serious pandemic until scientific information proves otherwise. Regular use of 
the psychometric model over time will give an overview of the average risk perception 
development and give some insight into the messages’ effectiveness. Should later 
measurement show the same results, especially if scientific information seems to suggest a 
serious pandemic, then this is a cause for concern. Either the message construct was 
ineffective and will therefore have to be readdressed or the message content was deemed 
irrelevant by the public. It is with this concern in mind that the mental model approach should 
be applied to ensure effective risk communication (i.e. effective message content and 
construction). 
The mental model approach, as described by Morgan and colleagues (2002), has the 
advantage of targeting knowledge gaps, or cognitive “barriers”, which may hinder appropriate 
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behavioral change and it provides an information organizational structure of the message 
content to make it reader friendly. If the public does not follow the promoted measures even 
though risk perceptions are measured as high by the psychometric model, or when risk 
perception may be low even though the general information provided says otherwise, then this 
suggests that there is something wrong. As said, either the messages are not working and must 
be readdressed, or there may be a knowledge gap, or cognitive “barrier”, which prevents 
appropriate behavioral change (e.g. the message is seen as irrelevant).  
For example, it is likely that prior experience with a surprisingly mild pandemic may 
have established a cognitive “barrier” that excludes large severe effects which needs to be 
addressed so that the public may see the sense in the “common sense” measures promoted 
during the pre-pandemic phase. The public may think that hygienic measures, such as 
washing of hands and sneezing/coughing in the crook of the arm, will have no effect since the 
pandemic will arrive and spread anyway. Or they may think some measures are ineffective as 
suggested by Synovate (2009) measurements on sneezing/coughing in the arm during the 
latest pandemic. One must then formulate specific information aimed at removing this 
wrongly perceived fact so that the public does see the sense of such a protective measures. 
This may involve a scientific explanation, simply organized and illustrated to make it reader 
friendly and prevent misunderstandings, which shows the effect of the different hygienic 
measures and explains why all should be used, or some more than others. One should also 
highlight that the hygienic measures are important to prevent infecting possible risk groups 
and so on to put the message in a bigger context. 
It is important to note that the mental model approach in theory only addresses the 
targeted population group (Morgan et al., 2002). In other words, if one targets and constructs 
a mental model of the general public then the messages are tailored to them. It is therefore 
important to also target other important groups, such as possible risk groups, to identify 
cognitive “barriers” relevant for only this group. The psychometric model may be used to 
identify specific groups warranting special attention. The mental model approach can then be 
used if attempts of risk communication to the groups prove ineffective. Lastly, the message 
content should be organized and constructed to inform its intended audience and suggest 
protective measures; no attempts of manipulation are to be performed. It is left to the 
recipients to judge the relevance of the message content. At best attempts at manipulation will 
be perceived as unethical and immoral. At worst, and more likely, it will lead to outrage 
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should it surface that the health authorities’ attempt to manipulate their recipients, and it 
would thereby destroy public trust in the health authorities.  
The downside of the mental model approach is that it requires time to produce and it 
provides much information which cannot easily be transmitted through the general media. 
One will likely find a few cognitive barriers which will need to be addressed, some more 
important than others, and they will require more information to prepare for action or 
intervention than simply saying “this is wrong”. The arguments to why something is a wrong 
perception will have to be substantiated and arguments supporting the promotion of protective 
measures by the health authorities will have to be produced. This information will be 
collected from different experts from expert fields deemed relevant. Web pages, brochures 
and other channels that allow much information to be included are needed to transmit such 
messages. Again, it will take time to produce and transmit such messages. However, such an 
endeavor is important to ensure effective promotion of protective behavior to the public. 
 
4.3.3 Providing the public with “tools” for critical analysis of message content 
Lastly, in the pre-pandemic phase, we address the issue of providing the public with 
“tools” that promote central route processing by which the individual can use to critically 
address information emanating from the different information sources which are likely to be 
available. The preparatory work starts during the pre-pandemic phase and must be maintained 
in the other phases. The first stage in ensuring that incorrect external sources of information 
do not get a foothold in defining the discourse during the pandemic has already been 
established. However, one cannot rely on general information sharing and promotion of 
“common sense”, or specific, protective measures to provide the public with enough “tools” 
of evaluation. Promotion of central route processing requires that the public is motivated and 
able to evaluate the message content (Petty et al., 2005; Petty et al., 2009). The thesis assumes 
that the public must be motivated to gather information due to the potential pandemic health 
risk which is impending. However, this will require supplying them with information which 
gives them the knowledge basis to effectively assess the information they are provided. 
The mental model approach is again a viable option to effectively map possible 
knowledge gaps which may limit or hinder such an evaluation. This would require experts to 
evaluate what information is needed to make such judgments (e.g. what is a pandemic virus, 
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how does it spread, how can risk estimates be interpreted etc.). The model will likely have to 
be used several times to be effective. However, simply providing the public with information 
aimed at education does not ensure that everyone will read it. Some will skip through it, some 
will not. Some may take it to heart, some may deny it. To further ensure that one promotes 
central route processing in the public the thesis advice the use of the RISCOM model of 
transparency, an arena of discourse, where central route processing is required. 
The RISCOM model of transparency is a theoretical model of discourse between 
different stakeholders. Within the pandemic risk the model’s intended use is to establish an 
arena wherein the different stakeholders can meet and challenge each others claim to truth, 
legitimacy and authenticity (c.f. Andersson et al., 2006). This goes both ways, the 
stakeholders may challenge the health authorities, and the health authorities may challenge the 
stakeholders. The discussion should preferably be open for the media to attend (Drottz-
Sjöberg, 2012). This involves inviting journalists to attend the meetings. Afterwards they are 
free to decide if they want to produce news stories of the meetings. It is important to note that 
inviting the media should preferably be done in larger meetings of importance, that is, 
meetings where the topics for discussion have been clarified (i.e. what is the problem and how 
to solve it) and where the format for discussion has been tailored and clarified by the 
reference group and accepted by the participants. Further, should media attendance be deemed 
as disturbing for the discussion process by the stakeholders and/or reference group then the 
reference group will have to evaluate postponing of the invitation of the media. 
The use of the RISCOM model requires time and thought before being implemented. 
The success of the model is build upon stakeholder participation. Stakeholder participation 
involves inviting groups which are important for the topic of discussion (e.g. experts in 
scientific fields, and/or population groups, relevant for the discussion matter) while keeping 
the arena open for other individuals or groups to attend which have a stake in the discussion. 
The organization of the meeting is decided by the reference group (e.g. how many people can 
actually attend and how one should organize a fair participation for the different groups etc.). 
The goal is for the different stakeholders to present their point of view on the topical matter. 
If, for example, identified risk groups do not participate in the discourse arena there are not 
any incentive for them to follow the discussion. As such, this is no incentive for them to use 
cognitive effort to analyze and evaluate the discussion and the internal considerations. If they 
are included, however, then their point of view may be challenged by the health authorities 
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and vice versa, that is, using the idea of “stretching” (Andersson et al., 2006). Again this will 
likely promote central route processing for all involved. 
In terms of initial implementation of the model during a pandemic, the health 
authorities could have the responsibility to initiate its use on a national level (and regional or 
communal level if deemed necessary). Though in theory other governmental agencies, or 
external organizations and so on, may also initiate its implementation on a national, regional 
or communal level. The selected reference group will assume overall responsibility for 
organizing subsequent meetings. It could therefore be the health authorities which have the 
initial responsibility for evaluating which stakeholders groups are invited to participate in the 
discussion. Stakeholders to attend are somewhat defined by scientific information (e.g. 
identified risk groups, children may be more exposed requiring a representative for the 
parents, etc.). However, the health authorities will beforehand have insight into “traditional” 
risk groups, groups which are generally at greater risk from diseases, such as people with 
underlying diseases, very young or old people. Given such a framework the model can be 
used in the pre-pandemic phase. Further, as said, it is important that the arena is open for all 
potential stakeholders outside those defined early on by the health authorities to participate, 
and some thought can be invested in how to announce such invitations. 
Lastly, it is important to note that the RISCOM arena is an arena of mutual respect for 
each other’s opinions and views. As already mentioned, the discussions within the arena are 
built upon the tailored format of discussion decided by the reference group (Drottz-Sjöberg, 
2012). The meetings may develop into a situation of heated debate, but the format does not 
allow the debate to involve, for example, unfounded criticism and accusations. Principles of 
respectful two-way communication are built upon fair and equal treatment and participant 
inclusion in the discussion, not indirect exclusion of participants in the discussion through, for 
example, use of rhetoric strategies aimed at weakening selected participant credibility. It is the 
role of the reference group, and the chair of the discussion, to ensure that everyone follows 
and maintain the structured format for discussion. While the process guardian has the 
responsibility for preventing possible concealed manipulation from any of the discussion 
partners (Andersson, et. al., 2006; Drottz-Sjöberg, 2012). 
To summarize, it is advised to use both the mental model approach and the RISCOM 
model of transparency to promote individual central route processing in the populace. The 
mental model approach is more educational in its approach while the RISCOM model is more 
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practical, an arena where points of view can be discussed and challenged, and therefore 
helpful in developing better “tools” of communicating risk and evaluating message content. 
The result of central route processing is more durable attitudes and subsequent behavior 
resistant to contrary information (Petty et al., 2009). It is important to note that the central 
route processing means that the individual may decide to adopt an attitude or behavior which 
is not in line with, or contrary, to that promoted by the health authorities. According to ELM 
this decision is made because it is the most helpful for the individual to get through the 
pandemic (c.f. Petty et al., 2005). However, providing the population with “tools” for 
evaluating message content is not meant to be only the individual in relation to oneself. 
Successful use of the mental model approach and RISCOM model means that the individual 
would also be made aware of the risks one may impose on others by ones actions. Should a 
significant portion of the public decide to adopt a behavior which can be defined as unhealthy 
for the individual and/or others, given the pandemic risk, then something has clearly gone 
wrong. The health authorities must then quickly readdress their messages and use suggested 
methods to see if they can identify what has gone wrong. 
 
4.4 Risk communication during the main pandemic phase 
The main pandemic phase presents more direct challenges to risk communication since the 
pandemic virus have been introduced into the country. As always the health authorities will 
continue with giving regular situational updates and promoting protective measures. 
However, should the pandemic reach the country relatively early, before one have acquired 
enough scientific information to produce specific risk communication, then this phase will 
continue with the promotion of “common sense” measures started during the pre-pandemic 
phase. However, should this be the case then the promotion of “common sense” should be (i) 
more aimed towards commonly known risk groups and (ii) known high risk places. 
Information specifically aimed at the risk groups involves an increased emphasis on providing 
them with information about the known symptoms of the pandemic virus along with 
recommendations of preventive measures, such as, contact the local doctor or hospital if one 
shows these symptoms. The goal is to protect their health and secondly to present more direct 
information about the pandemics health risks to such groups. Effects on the general public 
will be observable over time; the priority is the known risk groups. Information aimed at high 
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risk places are locations where many people gather, such as schools or hospitals where the 
pandemic virus may spread quickly and/or put risk groups at greater risk of infection. 
As more scientific information becomes available over time during this period one can 
assume that one of four selected situational alternatives will characterize the pandemic risk. 
The situational alternatives are based upon estimations of likelihood and severity of the 
pandemic risk, that is, how probable is it for the average citizen to get infected by the virus 
and what are the consequences of subsequent infection. It is the role of the risk assessor (i.e. 
FHI in Norway) to identify the current and/or possible future situation. Note that the selected 
situational alternatives discussed here are generic and illustrate the overall national pandemic 
situation and is not necessarily applicable to regional and communal situations which may 
arise. Further, should there be enough scientific information during the pre-pandemic phase to 
make reliable estimations of likelihood and severity then they will follow the examples of 
specific risk communication described here. 
Alternative 1: Low probability – low consequence situation (LPLC). A LPLC situation 
is characterized by a low probability of getting infected, and if one is infected the 
consequences are also low. Mitigation of the pandemic risk can be described as routine with 
little to no acts of concrete preventive measures or acts of risk communication, simply 
because there are no problems due to the mildness of the pandemic. The risk communication 
strategy can therefore be the same as described up to this point, since there may still be risk 
groups at higher risk, with a constant surveillance of the pandemic situation should the virus 
mutate and develop into one of the other situational alternatives. 
Alternative 2: High probability – High consequence situation (HPHC). A HPHC 
situation is characterized by a high probability of getting infected, and if one gets infected the 
consequences are likely to be severe or deadly. This situation is close to the “worst case 
scenario” defined by the Pandemic plan (HOD, 2006) and can be defined as a crisis. The main 
concern for the risk manager in Norway is to maintain and increase the essential community 
services, and through this, try to reduce sickness and deaths (HOD, 2006). This situation 
would require short time decision making and likely authoritarian risk management (e.g. 
forced quarantine, mandatory vaccination, etc.) and communication of risk and risk mitigation 
to ensure public health and lives. This situation falls into the area of crisis communication and 
therefore outside the framework of this thesis due to its focus upon risk communication as 
detailed in the introduction. 
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Alternative 3: High probability – low consequence situation (HPLC). A HPLC 
situation is characterized by a high probability for the average citizen of getting infected but a 
low consequence of any adverse effects from infection. This alternative is relatively similar to 
the latest pandemic. There are three main characteristics of this situation. Firstly, even though 
the pandemic virus is not dangerous to the average citizen it is still likely to be dangerous for 
known and identified risk groups. In other words, the risk groups are statistically likely to get 
infected and run a statistically larger risk of severe consequences from infection compared to 
the average Norwegian citizen. Secondly, even though the average citizen if not at great risk 
the virus may still causes some cases of severe illness and fatalities in the general public. 
Lastly, there will be a relatively large main pandemic wave in this situational alternative 
which will cause a high sick leave from work which may be disadvantageous for the society 
as a whole, and specifically adverse for the personnel in health services. 
Risk communication during this situation is therefore posed with two main problems 
which will require the promotion of specific measures. Firstly, one must promote specific risk 
mitigation measures to the risk groups themselves. Secondly, one must promote protective 
measures to the general public designed to (i) ensure the health of the risk group, and (ii) 
minimizes the chance of fatalities and sickness in the general public. The thesis will address 
the risk groups first and then the general public.  
Risk groups: Specific measures for the risk groups during this situation are aimed at 
providing them information on how to protect themselves from infection. First and foremost it 
is important to provide regular information about a potential vaccine if it is not available yet. 
If it is available then the risk groups become the first priority along with critical personnel 
such as hospital employees (HOD, 2006). The communication of risk will then largely follow 
the patterns seen during the first vaccination campaign during the latest pandemic. However, 
if the vaccine is not available this situation presents a greater risk to the risk groups than in the 
other situational alternatives due to the relatively ease of getting infected by the virus. As 
always it is important to communicate “common sense” measures such as hygienic measures, 
along with more specific “common sense” measures this situation would require for the risk 
groups, such as avoiding public areas with a large concentration of people.  
Cause for concern when communicating risk to the risk groups in this situation is if 
they do not follow the promoted protective measures from the health authorities. It is possible 
that the risk groups might have become habituated to the risk; that is, denying or avoiding, or 
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otherwise decreasing perceived risk, if the general media and health authorities do not report 
any adverse events relevant for this group which may mitigate this effect (c.f. Lima, 2004). It 
is then important to continually update who constitutes the risk groups to avoid possible 
undetected “gray areas” (e.g. people with underlying diseases, pregnant etc., some risk groups 
will be identified through scientific information, some are known beforehand) and remind 
them of the possible severity of the pandemic risk so they do not forget or lower their risk 
estimates (c.f. Wåhlberg & Sjöberg, 2000). Another likely scenario however, is reports of 
fatalities belonging to the risk groups, as seen during the latest pandemic (DSB, 2010). 
Individuals in the risk groups should theoretically perceive the pandemic risk as severe for 
them. If the individuals in the risk groups do not follow the health authorities’ advice it may 
be because they are not aware they belong to a risk group, or maybe deem the promoted 
measures as inadequate in mitigating the pandemic risk. In other words, the individuals will 
trust their own knowledge to make judgments about the pandemic risk and not rely on the 
health authorities (c.f. Drottz-Sjöberg, 2003; Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000).  
It is important for the health authorities to identify possible misunderstandings and 
misrepresentations of the pandemic risk which may cause the individuals to ignore health 
authority advice. Again, this is an arena best addressed by the mental models approach which 
may be used to identify knowledge gaps or cognitive “barriers” which limits or prevents the 
adaptation of healthy behavior. Identified knowledge gaps or cognitive “barriers” may then be 
challenged and new knowledge can be provided which, if the recipients judge the knowledge 
as relevant, may supplanted the knowledge gaps thereby promoting healthy behavior. 
 The general public: Communicating risk to the general public during this situational 
alternative should most importantly be aimed towards decreasing the chance of infecting 
potential risk groups, as well as limiting spread in general. Should the vaccine be available 
then risk communication will be the same as seen during the second vaccination campaign 
during the latest pandemic (DSB, 2010). Should the vaccine not be available then it is 
important for the health authorities to continually emphasize the use of “common sense” 
protective measures designed to limit the spread of the virus.  
However, as opposed to the risk groups the general public is more likely to become 
gradually habituated to the pandemic risk unless adverse events are being reported that would 
mitigate this effect (c.f. Lima, 2004). The public is likely to reduce their risk estimates over 
time, possibly choosing to forego protective behavior. It is also reasonable to assume that as 
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the public derive more knowledge about the pandemic risk, and does not experience any 
adverse events which may contradict this knowledge, they are likely to increasingly trust their 
own knowledge to judge the pandemic risk and not rely on the warnings from the health 
authorities’ (c.f. Drottz-Sjöberg, 2003; Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). For the average citizen 
this in itself is not a wrongful judgment leading to risky behavior towards themselves and 
other people. However, should the general public forego protective measures to limit spread 
then it will increase the risk of infecting risk groups. As such it is important to formulate 
messages specifically aimed towards the general public, informing them and making them 
aware of also the intention to safeguard risk groups, and in other words, to promote solidarity.  
In general terms this would require repeated communications of the pandemic risk and 
the general public responsibility towards the risk groups so they do not forget and lower their 
risk estimates (Wåhlberg & Sjöberg, 2000) due to a habituation effect (Lima, 2004). More 
specific messages can be constructed by using the mental model approach which may identify 
knowledge gaps which may be used to develop more concrete messages aimed at protecting 
the risk groups. Further development of the “tools” of evaluation provided by the health 
authorities in the pre-pandemic phase is also important since something has gone wrong if the 
general public fails to take into account risk groups when evaluating the pandemic risk in 
relation to their own behavior towards others. This would be facilitated by the use of the 
RISCOM model, in addition to mental modeling, to promote “stretching” of argumentations 
in the different stakeholders in the discussion; most importantly between the representatives 
of the risk groups and those representing the major population groups (i.e. the general public).  
Alternative 4: Low probability – high consequence situation (LPHC). During a LPHC 
situation an individual will have a low chance of getting infected by the virus but would 
experience severe adverse effects from being infected. In this situation merely getting infected 
may have dire consequences for the average person; however, as always, known and 
identified risk groups will be considered to be at greater risk from infection. Should this 
situational alternative be clear during the pre-pandemic phase then reports from the general 
media and the health authorities will be of severe effects and fatalities abroad. Should the 
situational alternative arise during the main pandemic phase then it is reasonable to assume 
that the severe effects and possible fatalities have already been reported within Norway. 
Whichever the case the early reports of severe incidents and fatalities will create a tense 
situation due to the severity of the pandemic for the average citizen. As such this situation will 
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likely not be remedied by communicating expert assessment of low probability of infection, 
what matters for the public are the consequences if one is infected (c.f. Sjöberg, 1999b).  
The main challenges for risk communication during this period are therefore to limit 
the potential spread of the pandemic and, more importantly, inform the public of what to do if 
they get infected as to minimize the consequences of getting infected. Since both the average 
citizen, and individuals in the risk groups, are at risk of suffering severe consequences the 
message to both groups are more or less the same. Given that scientific information do not 
provide information proving otherwise such as people with respiratory illnesses will die. This 
would again likely require mandatory quarantine of such groups falling into the area of crisis 
communication. Should a vaccine be available then risk communication efforts are aimed 
towards promoting the use of the pandemic vaccine to limit spread and ensure public 
immunity. As per the pandemic plan (2006) the risk groups are still prioritized as, all things 
being equal, they are theoretically more likely to experience more extreme adverse effects 
from infection. Should the vaccine not be available then risk communication during this 
situational alternative will face challenges contingent upon the development of the pandemic 
risk and its effect upon public perceived risk. 
As already mentioned, one can assume that initial reports of severe cases of infection 
will generally increase the public risk perception. If a vaccine is not available it is important 
that communications of risk emphasize the continued use of “common sense” measures to 
protect oneself and others from infection. However, cases of infection will undoubtedly occur 
and the health authorities will have to prepare for such cases. In terms of general risk 
communication this involves providing information to the public about the measures they 
have prepared, such as crisis centre on hospitals, to ensure the health of infected individuals. 
It is not possible to let infected individuals take care of themselves due to the severity of the 
pandemic virus. Should such measures not be followed then the thesis advice the use of the 
mental model approach as described above to effectively address possible knowledge gaps 
and misunderstandings which may be salient. Lastly, it is important that the health authorities 
give regular updates about the condition of those infected for three main reasons. Firstly, the 
public will want to know about the seriousness of the pandemic and the health of those 
infected. Secondly, providing information about what the health authorities are doing to 
ensure public health and lives will further ensure public trust in the health authorities as 
capable of handling the pandemic risk. Lastly, providing regular updates about the seriousness 
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of the pandemic risk will further prevent the chances of a habituation effect taking place over 
time should reported incidents be far in-between each others (c.f. Lima, 2004).  
Considerable challenges for the health authorities during this situation will arise 
should there be reported many incidents within a short time period which are likely to receive 
considerable media coverage. Such an incidence will break the perceived norm of few 
incidents of infections even though it cannot be ascribed to the pandemic situation as a whole. 
However, only time will prove this for certain and the health authorities cannot claim for 
certain if the sudden increase is a sporadic incidence or because of mutation of the virus. Such 
a situation will fall under the general area of increased risk communication or even crisis 
communication; requiring quick response and rapid dissemination of information to the public 
to prevent other sources of information to draw conclusions. “Normal” risk communication 
will resume after the crisis have been averted and will follow the procedure described above.  
However, it is also important for the health authorities to argue for why such an event 
can occur and explain the difficulties of predicting if it can happen again. Risk 
communication needs to strengthen public beliefs in science ability to provide answers, that 
is, epistemic trust, or public trust in the health authority’s knowledge basis, more than ever 
(c.f. Sjöberg, 2001). Public trust has been maintained so far because the promoted measures 
and risk estimates by the health authorities have seemed to be correct, giving little reason for 
the public to distrust them and for other external sources to effectively criticize them. After 
such an event, as the quick and serious development described above, however, the situation 
may have turned. It is easy for others to prove that the promoted measures do not seem to 
work, illustrated by the severe cases, but difficult for the health authorities to prove that the 
promoted measures do work (e.g. washing of hands X times prevents X infections). This is a 
difficult situation for the risk communicator to be in and is unlikely to be effectively handled 
if making time prove their point (another similar situation may occur). A more viable solution 
would be effective use of the RISCOM model so the situation may be fully discussed and 
invite claims to truth to be challenged and further reflected upon and thereby enhance 
epistemic trust. This involves assuming that the health authorities do everything they can with 
the information they have available. It is also an arena and opportunity where the health 
authorities may provide information on their mitigation efforts and how they will prepare for 
a similar event should it occur.   
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4.5 Risk communication during the post pandemic phase 
The last phase during a pandemic is a phase of evaluation and consideration of the health 
authority’s efforts during the pre- and main-pandemic phase. Communication of risk during 
this period is to some extent to make the public aware that the current risk situation is in 
decline, but that there will be other pandemics in the future. It is an opportunity to ensure 
public trust in the health authorities as capable and responsible managers of a future pandemic 
risk, and other future health risks, which may occur. In terms of risk communication research 
it is a phase wherein the main goal is to ensure social trust for the management of the next 
pandemic or health risk. The important thing is to evaluate previous efforts, find out what 
worked and what did not and communicate this to the public. What is important throughout 
this evaluation phase is transparency. Let the public get access to the health authorities’ 
evaluation of the decision making processes during the pandemic. More importantly; allow 
and invite the public to give feedback on the health authority’s mitigation and risk 
communication efforts.  
As said in the introduction, rating of risk communication effectiveness will depend 
upon what one tries to achieve by communicating the risk. The thesis have provided a 
theoretical framework on how to achieve effective risk communication during pandemic risk 
situations, that is, based assumptions of public attitude and behavioral change due to risk 
communication. However, theory cannot supplant real feedback. The post-pandemic phase 
provides an excellent opportunity where the pandemic and the health authorities risk 
communication efforts is still fresh in the minds of the public. Feedback from the public thus 
gives a real rating of what was effective and what was not and may provide suggestions to 
what can be improved and what can be removed. The RISCOM model of transparency 
provide an ample method of discourse where issues of risk management and risk 
communication efficiency can be evaluated and put under the critical eye of the public. Again, 
the goal of using the model, and utilization of the general feedback, is not meant to decide the 
course for handling of the next pandemic. It is meant to be a two-way process of evaluation to 
create awareness for the health authorities, and the public of what, transpired during the 
pandemic and provide suggestions of improvement on mitigation and risk communication. 
However, the phase is also one of potential concessions and probably accusations. It is 
important that the health authorities admit their wrongs if mistakes were made and act 
responsible. Doing otherwise is to act in an antagonistic manner and is likely to result in the 
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health authorities being perceived as an arrogant or non-caring entity which may severely 
damage their trustworthiness (c.f. Sjöberg, 2008). It is not the goal here to make excuses or 
deny blame; after all it is given that the health authorities took formal ownership of the case 
and are formally responsible. Admitting faults and explaining what can be done better, and 
thus to learn from past mistakes, will instill trust in the health authorities to be able to manage 
the next pandemic risk. In this regard we also mean it is important that the health authorities 
let other non-governmental organizations or institutions make professional evaluations of 
their handling of the pandemic risk. This will provide deeper insight into their handling of the 
risk as opposed to their own evaluations and that of the public. It will also deny any 
accusations of biased, subjective evaluations should the health authorities do their own 
evaluations.  
 
4.6 Final remarks 
The thesis has presented a background and general framework of a future pandemic in 
Norway. General and specific factors of risk perception and situational variables which may 
affect risk communication efforts have been considered within each phase of the framework 
and the situational alternatives which may arise (except the HPHC case). A more general risk 
communication strategy for the duration of a pandemic risk has been outlined. The general as 
well as the specific risk communication strategies meant to illustrate examples of how to 
effectively solve problems which may arise within each phase and situational alternative of a 
future pandemic. Essential to the effectiveness to the risk communication strategy are the 
impact of risk perception upon risk communication and the choice and use of scientific 
models of risk communication. The choice and use of the scientific models of risk 
communication in this thesis were meant as tools to identify public misconceptions, gaps of 
knowledge or cognitive “barriers” and for providing information to address these issues; 
while also providing “tools” for evaluation of message content. Lastly, the thesis has aimed at 
highlighting the importance of dissemination of information, and public involvement in the 
evaluation and consideration of the latest pandemic to further ensure risk communication 
effectiveness for future health risks. Done correctly the efforts of risk communication during 
the post-pandemic phase are expected to help ensure public trust in the health authorities’ as 
competent and responsible managers vis-a-vis future health risk.  
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5.0 Conclusions and last comments 
The thesis has reviewed communication of risk during the A (H1N1) situation for a discussion 
of how best to prepare for a future pandemic. Risk perception theory, specifically based on the 
psychometric paradigm, has shown the need to include factors of how people react and 
respond to risk information to be able to communicate more effectively. Two selected 
approaches, one firmly based in social cognition (mental modeling) and information 
processing (ELM), and one developed in the risk communication field work (RISCOM), have 
shown that structured analysis of both  message content and context can assist in and further 
develop risk communication efficiency. History of, and more details on, previous pandemics, 
have especially shown that: 
- The difficulties attached to predicting future pandemics, for example with respect to 
probability and severity, are substantial. 
- Uncertainties are predominant in the early phases of risk assessment. 
- One must expect a close relationship between risk estimates and risk communication 
content and strategy. For example, highly uncertain estimates usually demand more 
general countermeasures, whereas more precise risk estimates allow for more specific 
communication efforts. 
- Data collected in Norway and Europe have shown that reactions reflect both the 
development or spread of the disease as well as the information about the situation.  
- The data based on survey results show that the Norwegian population generally scored 
high on trust. 
The discussion focuses on the need and importance of a continuous monitoring, for 
example regarding perception changes and their bases, risk assessment developments across 
time, and collecting feedback on communication efforts as well as evaluate the lessons learnt. 
In all, there is much to be learnt from past events, but the future always holds uncertainties 
and surprises.  
The central problem of the thesis concerned the question of what is an effective risk 
communication strategy for informing the public about a pandemic health risk. It has been 
underlined that risk communication effectiveness is contingent upon providing the public with 
regular correct information and good advice which they can use to mitigate the (pandemic) 
risk. However, uncertainty in scientific risk assessment limits what information the risk 
managers have available; making risk communication difficult, especially at the early stages 
96 
 
of a pandemic. Until the risk managers know more they are in a position where it is important 
to communicate what they know, and do not know. Risk communication under uncertainty is 
therefore reliant upon prior knowledge from similar situations and involving, for example, 
promoting protective measures to the public which are known important to succeed in 
mitigating the pandemic risk, but cannot entirely hinder or solve it. As more scientific 
information is made available risk communication can be more specific, involving targeting 
groups and individuals, to ensure public health and lives.  
Essential in strengthening the efficiency of the risk communication strategy is the use 
of available scientific models of communication. As this thesis has shown, scientific models 
such as mental modeling and the RISCOM approach are more systematic approaches to guide 
risk communication, for example for updates and availability of information, to effectively 
identify and address public risk perception. To systematically plan the use of models that 
outline thinking and reactions in greater detail may avoid limitations or hindrances of 
protective behavior. If correctly used such models may also provide the target population with 
“tools” for evaluation of message content from different sources of information. Lastly, the 
risk communication strategy ought not to stop when the pandemic risk subsides. It is 
recommended that an effective risk communication strategy aim at providing a strong basis 
for future risk communication in a health risk event. This entails learning from successes and 
mistakes from the latest pandemic, as well as continued efforts ensuring public trust in the 
authorities as capable and responsible managers of a future health risk.  
This general conclusion on effective risk communication strategy is supported by 
selected available data from the latest pandemic. However, the knowledge of specific effects 
of various communication models are limited by the current lack of empirical research to give 
accurate measurements of the scientific models’ effectiveness. Future research should 
therefore investigate in more detail the use of scientific models and their practical use and 
effectiveness in health risk settings. Lastly, the role of risk perceptions as a determinant of 
future behavior is a contested issue in risk research. More research is needed to determine its 
precise role in influencing and determining behavior, and thus, to better specify its role in 
future effective risk communication. Nevertheless, ignoring risk perception when 
communicating risk would be contra productive, and ignoring public concern during a health 
risk situation would severely undermine risk managers’ credibility. It is the belief of the 
author that continuous and strategic work in the future risk communication arena should 
involve evaluations of specific communication models and their validity in various situations 
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(e.g. high or low expected consequences or probabilities), as well as further the understanding 
of the roles of risk perception components (e.g. emotions, cognitions, and situation framing) 
in risk perception. 
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Appendix A Illustration of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) 
 
 
Note fav. mean favorably and unfav. mean unfavorably.  
No 
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Yes unfav. Yes fav. 
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Yes 
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Persuasive communication 
Motivated to process? 
(Personal Involvement, need for 
cognition, etc.) 
Ability to process? 
(distraction, repetition, 
knowledge, etc.) 
What is the nature of the 
processing? 
(argument quality, initial attitude, 
etc.) 
More favorable 
thoughts than 
before? 
More unfavorable 
thoughts than 
before? 
Is there a change in cognitive structure? 
Thought rehearsal, reflection time, etc. 
Peripheral attitude shift 
Changed attitude is relatively temporary, 
susceptible to counterpersuasion, and 
unpredictive behavior 
Is a peripheral process operating? 
(expertise of source, source attractiveness, 
use of heuristics, etc.) 
Retain initial attitude 
Attitude does not change from 
previous position 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Central positive/negative attitude 
change 
Change attitude is relatively enduring, resistant 
to counterpersuasion, and predictive of 
behavior 
108 
 
Illustration of Elaboration Likelihood Model. Adapted from “The elaboration likelihood 
model of persuasion: Developing health promotions for sustained behavioral change,” in In R. 
J. DiClemente, R. A. Crosby, & M. Kegler (Eds.), Emerging theories in health promotion 
practice and research (2
nd
 ed.) (pp. 185-214). San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass. 
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Appendix B Illustration of influence diagram 
 
All materials here are extracted from Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom and Atman (2002, p. 37). 
Illustration of influence diagram adapted from Morgan and colleagues (2002, p. 37). 
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b) 
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c) 
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“Illustration of the construction of influence diagram for the risk of tripping and falling on the 
stairs: a) shows just two elements; b) adds factors that could cause a person to trip; c) adds 
factors that might prevent fall after a person trips; and d) introduces decisions that residents 
could make that would influence the probabilities of tripping and falling”. Morgan and 
colleagues (2002, p. 37). 
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Appendix C The WHO pandemic phases 
Text extracted from WHO (2009b, p. 25 – 26). 
 
 
Illustrated are the WHO pandemic phases and their general meaning. Adapted from WHO 
(2009b).  
“Phase 1: No viruses circulating among animals have been reported to cause 
infections in humans. 
Phase 2: An animal influenza virus circulating among domesticated or wild animals is 
known to have caused infection in humans, and is therefore considered a potential pandemic 
threat. 
Phase 3: An animal or human-animal influenza reassortant virus has caused sporadic 
cases or small clusters of disease in people, but has not resulted in human-to-human 
transmission sufficient to sustain community-level outbreaks. Limited human-to-human 
transmission may occur under some circumstances, for example, when there is close contact 
between an infected person and an unprotected caregiver. However, limited transmission 
under such restricted circumstances does not indicate that the virus has gained the level of 
transmissibility among humans necessary to cause a pandemic.  
Time 
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Phase 4: Is characterized by verified human-to-human transmission of an animal or 
human-animal influenza reassortant virus able to cause “community-level outbreaks”. The 
ability to cause sustained disease outbreaks in a community marks a significant upwards shift 
in the risk of a pandemic. Any country that suspects or has verified such an event should 
urgently consult with WHO so that the situation can be jointly assessed and a decision made 
by the affected country if implementation of a rapid pandemic containment operation is 
warranted. Phase 4 indicates a significant increase in risk of a pandemic but does not 
necessarily mean that a pandemic is a foregone conclusion.  
Phase 5: Is characterized by human-to-human spread of the virus into at least two 
countries in one WHO region. While most countries will not be affected at this stage, the 
declaration of Phase 5 is a strong signal that a pandemic is imminent and that the time to 
finalize organization, communication; and implementation of the planned mitigation measures 
is short. 
Phase 6: The pandemic phase, is characterized by community level outbreaks in at 
least one other country in a different WHO region in addition to the criteria defined in Phase 
5. Designation of this phase will indicate that a global pandemic is under way.  
During the Post-peak period, pandemic disease levels in most countries with adequate 
surveillance will have dropped below peak observed levels. The post-peak period signifies 
that pandemic activity appears to be decreasing; however, it is uncertain if additional waves 
will occur and countries will need to be prepared for a second wave. 
In the post-pandemic period, influenza disease activity will have returned to levels 
normally seen for seasonal influenza. It is expected that the pandemic virus will behave as a 
seasonal influenza A virus. At this stage, it is important to maintain surveillance and update 
pandemic preparedness and response plans accordingly. An intensive phase of recovery and 
evaluation may be required”. 
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Appendix D Poster: Habits that prevent influenza 
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Poster published by the Norwegian Institute of Public Health. Permission to copy the poster 
granted by Per Kristian Svendsen from the Norwegian Institute of Public Health 18
th
 of April, 
2012. 
 Translation of the poster are given per picture.  
Picture 1: “With a paper hankerchief in front of the mouth and nose you shield others when 
you cough or sneeze. Discard the paper hankerchief after use. Then wash hands”. 
Picture 2: “Use the crook of the arm when you have to cough or sneeze and do not have a 
paper hankerchief available”. 
Picture 3: “Was hands often and thoroughly, especially when you have been among people”. 
Picture 4: “Hand desinfection with substances that contain alcohol is a good alternative 
when you cannot wash your hands, for example when travelling”. 
 
